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ADDRESSING THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF UNDOCUMENTED
IMMIGRATION ON THE AMERICAN WORKER:
PRIVATE RICO LITIGATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
ELISABETH J. SWEENEY YU*
As a nation that values immigration, and depends on immi-
gration, we should have immigration laws that work and
make us proud. Yet today we do not.
-President George W. Bush'
President Bush and members of Congress have discussed
recently the merits of guest worker programs to deal with the
flow of foreign-born laborers into the United States.' In consid-
ering the "value" of immigrants in American society, an impor-
tant question is whether undocumented workers in the United
States hurt the American worker or help the economy by taking
"unwanted" but necessary jobs. This Note discusses a judicial
tool four circuit courts of appeal have accepted that has similar
goals as these policy proposals. The Second, Sixth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits have approved of suits in which citizen attor-
neys general act through the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) 3 to enforce public policy that protects
American labor from the negative impact of undocumented
workers. The Seventh Circuit has not approved this same
* Lisa Yu, a J.D. candidate at Notre Dame Law School (2006), received
her B.A. in Political Science and Spanish from Indiana University-Bloomington
and her Master's Degree in Comparative Ethnic Conflict from Queen's Univer-
sity-Belfast. Thanks to Brad Russo for his valuable insights and encouragement
through the writing process and to Professor Elizabeth Bruch for comments on
an earlier draft. Thanks also to Marci Guevara and Maria Cruz-Melendez who
helped locate an initial draft of much of the immigration background informa-
tion in Part II.A. of this Note. As always, thanks to my family for their undying
love and support; my mom and dad, Laura and Vic, and my brother Dave,
whom I miss very much and who is the reason I came to Notre Dame.
1. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Proposes
New Temporary Worker Program (Jan. 7, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2004/01/20040107-3.html.
2. See Stuart Rothenburg, Many Republicans Look Ready to Gamble on Immi-
gration Reform, ROLL CALL, Oct. 24, 2005, at 8; Richard W. Stevenson, President
Renews Effort to Overhaul Immigration Policy, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 29, 2005, at A18.
3. Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2000)).
910 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20
method of dealing with this important public policy problem.
This circuit split will come before the Supreme Court this term
when it considers Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc.4
Part I of this Note introduces this RICO theory of labor law
enforcement in the undocumented worker context. Part II sum-
marizes the impact of undocumented migration on the United
States, and particularly on the American worker, taking into
account the current United States labor market and immigration
regime. Part III analyzes the policy proposals, including guest
worker programs that attempt to address this situation. Part IV
presents the judicial alternative, which has been used by employ-
ees (both documented and undocumented), competitors, and
local government. The Note concludes by suggesting that this
controversial judicial mechanism can succeed in remedying
some of the same problems that public policy programs con-
front, but must be a compliment to a broader immigration policy
that considers the ethical considerations and realities of undocu-
mented migration.
I. THE RICO THEORY OF LABOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
IN IMMIGRATION
As immigrants and immigration are increasingly contro-ver-
sial in American politics, the President and the Congress have
proposed major initiatives to deal with the perceived problems
accompanying the flow of new workers, while at the same time
appealing to the country's historical roots as a welcomer of the
oppressed and downtrodden.5 Balancing these two goals-pro-
tecting domestic workers from the wage pressures brought on by
surges of foreign-born persons and still being a beacon of hope
to the poor of second and third-world nations-is, obviously, dif-
ficult. President Bush's dramatic and broad guest worker pro-
gram and a variety of Congressional alternatives attempt to
4. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 411 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2005), cert.
granted, 126 S. Ct. 830 (2005).
5. These programs included the President's initiative; the Secure America
and Orderly Immigration Act, S. 1033, H.R. 2330, 109th Cong. (2005) (known
as the Kennedy-McCain proposal); the Comprehensive Enforcement and Immi-
gration Reform Act of 2005, S. 1438, 109th Cong. (2005) (known as the
Cornyn-Kyl Proposal); the REAL GUEST Act, H.R. 3333, 109th Cong. (2005)
(sponsored by Rep. Tom Tancredo); and the Save America Comprehensive
Immigration Act of 2005, H.R. 2092, 109th Cong. (2005) (sponsored by Rep.
Sheila Jackson-Lee) (this bill does not include a new guest worker proposal, but
complements the Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act). The Border
Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, H.R.
4437, 109th Cong. (2005) (sponsored by Rep. Sensenbrenner), discussed infra
Part III, does not contain a guest worker provision.
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cherry-pick the aspects of foreign-born labor most appealing to
the American economy and the American worker without letting
the increased labor supply deteriorate employees' paychecks or
employment conditions. These guest worker programs target
the flow of migrant labor to select domestic industries, such as
agriculture, in need of substantially more unskilled laborers.'
This balancing strives for fairness and equity between those work-
ers already living in the United States and those workers wishing
to join them.
Proactive policy proposals, such as the guest worker option,
are just one way of approaching this issue. The political route is
not the only tool Americans have; the Second, Sixth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits have approved a tool for private citizen attor-
neys general to enforce immigration laws. Through the use of
RICO to sue employers for "lost property" when those employers
are engaged in systematic schemes to hire foreign-born workers
illegally, these private citizens can protect themselves from the
negative influence of undocumented labor while enforcing pol-
icy to protect such laborers from exploitation.
The "property" in these cases is the wages the legal workers
would have received had the employers not broken the law by
hiring undocumented workers. These lost wages, the injury to
the American worker, could come because the legal workers
were fired to make room for less costly undocumented labor, or
more subtly through depressed wages caused by the illegally
increased labor supply. Demonstrating its appeal and wide
reach, this mechanism has been used by competitors,7 legal
employees, 8 undocumented employees,9 and local county gov-
ernment officials. ' 0
The Seventh Circuit has declined to allow this private cause
of action, despite the RICO suits' ability to do what the President
and congressmen championing guest worker programs propose.
That is, this private cause of action targets the flow of foreign-
6. See infra Part III for a discussion of current guest worker proposals.
7. Commercial Cleaning Serv., LLC v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374,
379 (2d Cir. 2001).
8. Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2004).
9. Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.N.J. 2005).
10. A Canyon County, Idaho Commissioner filed a RICO suit against agri-
cultural companies, alleging participation in an "illegal immigrant hiring
scheme." The Commissioner became "the first government entity to use RICO
to demand damages from businesses for the costs of allegedly illegal employ-
ees." Rebecca Boone, Idaho County Sues Companies Over Illegals, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 28, 2005, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2005/
07/28/idaho-county-sues-companies-over illegals/?rss-id-Boston.com+%2F
+News.
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born labor toward those American industries in actual need of
such supply while prosecuting those industries that are simply
pursuing lower payrolls at the expense of the legally documented
worker. Since RICO-theory plaintiffs must demonstrate lost
wages, 1 suits by classes of legal workers would only be successful
in cases where employers are exploiting undocumented workers
and using these workers merely to suppress wages. Suits would
be unsuccessful in the other category of cases, where employers
are using the increased labor supply to survive, such as in the
agriculture industry, where the market for the resulting goods
would not support higher wages. In these cases, it would not be
possible to show lost wages due to the influx of undocumented
workers (and thus, not possible to show the injury required by
RICO). Therefore, RICO could not be used in these latter situa-
tions, but there would also be no injury to documented workers
of which to complain.
Legislation specifically designed with this targeted solution
in mind, namely the guest worker proposals, may well have
advantages over using the broad-based RICO statute. Through
such legislation, lawmakers can fine-tune an approach to the
undocumented worker issue and incorporate a broader vision for
understanding the problem. Unlike the use of RICO, targeted
legislation can also deal with ancillary problems and address
underlying causes of undocumented migration. However, the
judicial avenue is already available and accomplishes at least part
of what the political proposals desire. The judicial approach, in
granting this private cause of action would utilize the vast array of
private citizens, disgruntled over and injured by the failure of
immigration policy to check the flow of undocumented workers,
to enforce the nation's labor laws.
This discussion is complex, as it involves political, social, eth-
ical, and economic considerations, as well as a soon-to-be-
decided circuit split. For background, the next section of this
Note will examine the various ways in which undocumented
migration 2 affects American society and the ethical issues sur-
rounding migration to the United States.
11. In cases where the plaintiff is the government, the injury need not be
a loss of jobs or wages, but rather, could be the cost to taxpayers of undocu-
mented persons living in the community.
12. The word "immigration" in legal terminology implies intent to stay in
a new country permanently, but this may not be the case with the undocu-
mented persons who are the focus of this Note. For clarity, this Note will refer
to those who come to the United States to work without the proper legal docu-
mentation as "undocumented persons" or "undocumented migrants."
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II. BACKGROUND: IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON THE
UNITED STATES
Immigration' has been an integral part of American society
since before the nation's founding. This continues today, as one
in five residents is an immigrant or has at least one immigrant
parent." While migration to the United States has had a tre-
mendous impact for social and political reasons, the most con-
tentious aspect is its economic impact."5 The economic effect of
undocumented 6 migration is particularly charged and is felt in a
number of socio-economic ways.
Undocumented migration galvanizes public opinion, with
some decrying the perceived undercutting of wages and others
believing the acceptance of work by undocumented persons is
vital to the operation and health of the United States economy.
Whether one believes that the presence of undocumented per-
sons has a negative or positive effect will depend on what they
perceive as the number of undocumented persons who come to
the United States, how long they remain undocumented, how
many children they have, and what kind of services they use.
While this Note focuses on the economic impact of migration
13. Immigration is the movement of people from one country to another
with the aim of permanent settlement. To be clear, while the legal term of art
"immigrant" implies an intent to stay in a new country permanently, the word is
used often to refer generally to foreign-born persons, regardless of whether the
intent to stay is temporary or permanent.
14. See Cragg Hines, Some Mean to Give Thanks for Drawbridge They'd Raised,
Hous. CHRON., Nov. 24, 2004, at B9 ("Some of the biggest advocates of pulling
up the drawbridge come from groups that have crossed it most recently.").
15. The globalization of capital and labor has brought the concerns over
the effect of the undocumented worker on the American labor force to the
forefront of any discussion on immigration. There are many ethical questions
when a proudly diverse, immigrant-based nation begins questioning how many
more foreign-born persons, particularly those wishing to work and earn an hon-
est living, should be allowed in. The country's policy toward these people will
not only affect our economic well-being, but will convey a message about how
and to what degree American society values foreigners. From aJudeo-Christian
point of view, the Catholic Church does not believe that people are ever for-
eigners or aliens. See generally POPE JOHN XXIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER MATER ET
MAGISTRA (1961).
16. An undocumented worker is one without any government records to
verify his or her existence. Undocumented workers must avoid such records,
since their illegal entry into the United States might subject them to deporta-
tion. These persons enter the United States by avoiding official inspection,
passing through inspection with fraudulent documents, entering legally but
overstaying the terms of their visas, or violating the terms of their visas. Under
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), about 2.7
million unauthorized migrants were legalized.
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(specifically, undocumented migration) on the American labor
force, the other dimensions are important in understanding the
larger context of current immigration policy.
A. The Costs and Benefits of a Foreign-Born Population
The population of the United States is now near 300 mil-
lion,"7 and Hispanics comprise the fastest-growing and largest
minority group. 8 The Hispanic population is now 41.3 mil-
lion.' 0 In 2004, the undocumented population rose to 8.5 mil-
lion persons, a net increase each year of 500,000.20 Of these
500,000, an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 will leave the United
States, die, or become legal immigrants each year. 21 As of March
2005, the nation's foreign-born population (both legal and ille-
gal) reached a new record of 35 million.22 Of these, between 9
and 10 million are undocumented.23
This increasing undocumented population corresponds
with a dramatic increase in human smuggling and also an
increase in the number of people who die attempting to cross
the border. From 1998 to 2003, at least 1896 people died trying
to cross the southwestern United States border.24 In 2004, a
record 460 migrants died trying to cross this border area.25
17. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Nevada Edges Out Arizona as
the Fastest-Growing State (Dec. 22, 2005), available at http://www.census.gov/
Press-Release/www/releases/archives/population/006142.html; see also Associ-
ated Press, 2 Minorities SpurRapid U.S. Growth, N.Y. TIMES,June 15, 2004, at A16.
18. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Hispanic Population Passes 40
Million (June 9, 2005), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/
releases/archives/population/005164.html.
19. Id.
20. Ctr. for Immigration Studies, Current Numbers, http://www.cis.org/
topics/currentnumbers.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2006). "Net increase" repre-
sents all new illegal immigration minus deaths, legalizations, and out-migration
of illegal immigrants. J. GREGORY ROBINSON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ESCAP II:
DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS RESULTS 20 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/
dmd/www/pdf/Reportl.PDF.
21. VAN HOOK ET AL., UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS LIVING IN THE UNITED
STATES: A MID-DECADE PORTRAIT, MIGRATION INFORMATION SOURCE (2005),
http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/print.cfm?ID=329.
22. STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, IMMIGRANTS AT
MID-DECADE: A SNAPSHOT OF AMERICA'S FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN 2005, at 1
(2005), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/back1405.pdf.
23. Id. at 23.
24. WALTER A. EWING, AMER. IMMIGRATION LAw FOUND., THE COST OF
DOING NOTHING: THE NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM (2004),
available at http://v.ailf.org/ipc/policy-reports-2004-CostOfDoingNoth-
ing.asp.
25. Richard Marosi, Border Crossing Deaths Set a 12-Month Record, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2005, at Al.
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Despite increased border enforcement and travel risks, the
migration continues as undocumented persons come to this
country to fill millions of jobs in the American economy.
26
Mexico is the largest source for unauthorized migration,
with over five million undocumented persons and seventy per-
cent of the undocumented population coming from the United
States' southern neighbor.27 California, Arizona, and Texas are
the three states with the highest undocumented populations.
28
In fact, more than eigth percent of California's population is
composed of undocumented persons. 29 Arizona and Texas each
follow with approximately seven percent and six percent,
respectively.
30
Undocumented migration has many important economic
and fiscal effects. Two main issues bring immigrants to the
United States: family andjobs. Two thirds of documented migrants
are admitted not because of needed skills, but because of familial
relations.31 Most undocumented persons are here seeking work,
and if they could not find it, they would not come. They come to
fill a rising demand for low-skilled labor, which has been met
with a shrinking supply of workers. The Department of Labor
estimates short-term immigrants (documented and undocu-
mented) increase the labor supply in low-level jobs.12 They con-
26. Regina Germain, Perspectives on the Bush Administration's New Immigrant
Guestworker Proposal: The Time for Immigration Reform is Now, 32 DENV.J. INT'L L. &
POL'x 747, 749 (2004).
27. OFFICE OF POLICY AND PLANNING, U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZA-
TION SERV., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING
IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990 TO 2000, at 1 (2003), http://uscis.gov/graphics/
shared/aboutus/statistics/Ill_Reportr1211.pdf. The current growth rate of the
Hispanic population is 13%, almost four times that of the total population.
With an undocumented Mexican population growth of at least 7% (twice that
of the overall United States population growth) these figures would make
undocumented Mexicans responsible for 5.6% of the overall population growth
in the nation. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Hispanic and Asian Ameri-
cans Increasing Faster Than Overall Population (June 14, 2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/race/001839.
html (stating that the total population growth is 3.3%).
28. OFFICE OF POLICY AND PLANNING, supra note 27, at 6-8.
29. Id. at 8.
30. Id.
31. U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
THE TRIENNIAL COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON IMMIGRATION 12 (2002), http://
uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/repsstudies/tri3.pdf.
32. Prospects for American Workers: Immigration's Impact: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 108th Cong. 27 (2003) [hereinafter Prospects for American Workers], available
at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/108th/90126.pdf (pre-
pared statement of Daniel T. Griswold, CATO Inst.).
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centrate in large population areas: New York, Los Angeles, and
Chicago, which account for 34.5% of the immigrant popula-
tion.33 Nevertheless, the huge volume of goods and services
exchanged between cities across the country creates pressure
toward the equalization of the price of labor.34
Significantly, nearly seventy-five percent of undocumented
persons lack a high school degree.35 In 1997, the National
Research Council concluded that immigration (by both docu-
mented and undocumented persons) had a significant negative
impact on the wages of high school dropouts: the income of
those who lack a high school degree, eleven million of whom are
natives, was reduced by up to thirteen billion dollars a year.36 In
fact, the influx of foreign-born persons affected wages on the top
as well as the bottom: in 2000, the typical native man without a
high school diploma earned $25,000, and his reduction in wages
was $1800; the typical male college graduate earned $73,000, and
his wages were reduced by approximately $2600. 37 The Supreme
Court recognized this, stating that "illegal aliens ... [taking] sub-
standard... wages... can seriously depress wage scales... [for]
citizens and legally admitted aliens ... ."38
The kind of jobs undocumented workers fill is directly
related to relative education levels. Among the native popula-
tion, 12.5% of adults age twenty-five and older in 2003 lacked a
high school diploma, as compared to 32.8% of the foreign-born
(including both documented and undocumented) population.39
Given these numbers, it is only logical that a large number of
less-skilled jobs will be filled by foreign-born persons, and it
might appear that foreign-born workers displace their native-
born counterparts. However, this argument is not supported by
the performance of the United States economy in the 1990s, dur-
33. GEORGE J. BORJAS, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, INCREASING THE
SUPPLY OF LABOR THROUGH IMMIGRATION: MEASURING THE IMPACT ON NATE-
BORN WORKERS 2 (2004), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2004/back
504.pdf.
34. Id.
35. Prospects for American Workers, supra note 32.
36. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEM-
OGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 7 (James P. Smith & Barry
Edmonston eds., 1997). This figure is roughly equal to combined federal
expenditures on subsidized school lunches, low-income energy assistance, and
the Women, Infants, and Children Program. Id.
37. BORjAS, supra note 33, at 5-6.
38. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-57 (1976).
39. Rob Paral, No Way In: U.S. Immigration Policy Leaves Few Legal Options
for Mexican Workers, IMMIGRATION POL'Y IN Focus, July 2005, at 2, available at
http://www.ailf.org/ipc/nowayin.asp.
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ing which time the unemployment and poverty rates in the
United States among the native-born population fell substan-
tially4° while the United States was receiving the largest number
of foreign-born persons in its history.4'
Undocumented persons benefit the economy by filling a
demand and providing needed services. Employment in one-
third of all job categories would have tapered during the 1990s in
the absence of newly arrived workers, even if all United States-
born workers with recent experience in those categories had
been re-hired.42 There is still a need for foreign labor, as the
median age of United States workers is expected to rise from
thirty-six to fourty years old between 1990 and 2010, and econo-
mists estimate there will be an employment gap that the domestic
labor force is unlikely to fill.4 3 When coupled with the expecta-
tion that the number of essential worker jobs will grow by more
than 700,000 per year, foreign nationals provide a ready and will-
ing source of labor.44
Migration also has an important impact on taxes. The
National Research Council estimated in 2003 that the fiscal cost
for foreign-born households-service use minus tax payments-
could be as high as twenty-two billion dollars.45 If approximately
twenty-seven percent of the total immigrant population is
undocumented, the burden would be approximately $5.9 billion.
Moreover, surveys indicate up to one half of employers do not
even deduct taxes from the pay of undocumented workers.46
40. JOSEPH DALAKER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2000, at 7 (2001), http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p60-214.
pdf.
41. NOLAN MALONE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE FoREIGN-BoRN PoP-
ULATION: 2000, at 2 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003
pubs/c2kbr-34.pdf.
42. ROB PARAL, AM. IMMIGRATION LAW FOUND., ESSENTIAL WORKERS: IMMI-
GRANTS ARE A NEEDED SUPPLEMENT TO THE NATIVE-BoRN LABOR FORCE (2005),
available at http://www.ailf.org/ipc/policy-reports_2005-essentialworkers.asp.
According to this study, "data from the 2000 census indicate that even if native
workers could readily have moved to any part of the country in which jobs were
available during the 1990s, and even if they had been willing to accept any job
offered, there would not have been nearly enough unemployed native-born
workers to fill all available jobs." Id.
43. DANIEL T. GRISWOLD, CATO INST., WILLING WORKERS: FIXING THE
PROBLEM OF ILLEGAL MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 9 (2002), avail-
able at http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-019.pdf.
44. Id.
45. See Ctr. for Immigration Studies, Costs, http://www.cis.org/topics/
costs.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
46. DONALD L. HUDDLE, IMMIGRATION AND JOBS: THE PROCESS OF DIS-
PLACEMENT (1995), available at http://www.npg.org/forum-series/imm&jobs.
htm.
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Typically, undocumented persons receive a tax-free wage that is
around twenty to thirty percent lower than the going wage in a
given occupation; thus employers gain excess profits of at least
seventeen of the undocumented employee's wage.47
While the above statistics speak to the economic detriment
caused by undocumented persons, there is much to support the
economic value of immigrants, generally, and the undocu-
mented worker population, specifically. A study by the CATO
Institute contends that, after taking into account the jobs that
undocumented persons take and the new employment they cre-
ate, "immigrants do not increase the rate of native unemploy-
ment in the aggregate."4" Migrants also are a significant source
of tax revenue; some estimate that over the next seven years, they
will pay close to two trillion dollars more in social security tax
than they receive in social security payments.49 The Social Secur-
ity Administration found that nearly seventy-five percent of
undocumented workers pay payroll taxes.5" An Urban Institute
study also found that "undocumented immigrants contributed a
national total of $2.7 billion51 to Social Security and another
$168 million to unemployment insurance taxes, both programs
they will be unable to access because of their illegal status.
'52
Migrants (documented and undocumented) expand the
demand for goods and services by becoming consumers them-
selves.5" There are an estimated 220,000 undocumented persons
living in the Chicago metro area, with the consumer expendi-
tures by this group generating more than 31,000jobs in the local
economy and contributing $5.45 billion annually to the gross
47. Id.
48. JULIAN A. SIMON, CATO INST., IMMIGRATION: THE DEMOGRAPHIC &
ECONOMIC FACTS pt. 4 (1995), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_
report/pr-imnative.html. In this report, Simon questions the scientific merit of
Huddle's argument that immigrants displace native workers.
49. Am. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS'N, MYTHS AND FACTS IN THE IMMIGRA-
TION DEBATE 2 (2003), available at http://www.immigrationlinks.com/news/
AILA%20Backgrounder-Myths%20and%20Facts.pdf [hereinafter MYTHS AND
FACTS]
50. RANDY CAPPS & MICHAEL Fix, THE URBAN INST., UNDOCUMENTED IMMI-
GRANTS: MYTHS AND REALITIES 1 (2005), available at http://www.urban.org/Up
loadedPDF/900898_undocumented-immigrants.pdf.
51. The Social Security Administration estimates that undocumented per-
sons pay six to seven million dollars in Social Security taxes. Id.
52. AM. IMMIGRATION LAW FOUND., THE VALUE OF UNDOCUMENTED WORK-
ERS (2002), available at http://www.ailf.org/ipc/policy-reports_2002_value.asp.
53. Id. at 1.
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regional product.54 A 2002 Economic Report of the President
estimates that migrants raise the net income of Americans by one
billion dollars to fourteen billion dollars a year, while a similar
study by the National Research Council also found that immigra-
tion delivers a "significant positive gain" to the nation's
workforce of one billion dollars to ten billion dollars a year.55
United States immigration law has yet to fully acknowledge
the economic importance of immigration to the United States.
One policy advocate assessed:
Without the more than 12 million immigrants who arrived
in the 1990s-including some 5 million illegal aliens-the
U.S. would have created fewer jobs, experienced slower
economic growth and maintained a lower standard of liv-
ing for everyone. Large segments of agriculture, the poul-
try and beef industry, certain manufacturers, and other
employers faced with labor shortages or skyrocketing wages
would have been forced out of business or moved their
production abroad.56
Of particular importance to this Note is that foreign-born
persons, whether documented or not, also frequently "fill vital
niches in the low and high skilled ends of the labor market, thus
creating subsidiary job opportunities for Americans.
5 7
The United States has long depended on immigrants to
compensate for shortfalls in the native-born labor force. The
agricultural industry has recognized this fact for decades and
relied upon foreign-born workers to make up for the shortage of
native workers in the fields. 5' Organized labor also has accepted
the United States economy's need for foreign-born workers, as
exemplified by the AFL-CIO's shift to a pro-immigrant stance
54. Am. IMMIGRATION LAW FOUND., IMMIGRANTS HELP SUSTAIN CHICAGO'S
ECONOMY (2002), available at http://www.ailf.org/ipc/policy-reports-2002-chi-
cago.asp.
55. GRISWOLD, supra note 43, at 9.
56. Linda Chavez, Increase Legal Immigration, GOPUSA (May 5, 2005),
http://www.gopusa.com/commentary/lchavez/2005/lc_0505p.shtml.
57. MYTHS AND FACTS, supra note 49, at 1. For example, the presence of
undocumented persons has created opportunities for businesses and profes-
sionals that provide goods and services to these populations, not only directly
(such as a waiter who will receive more tips because he is waiting on more peo-
ple) but also indirectly (such as the company that provides the waiters'
uniforms).
58. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 created the Special
Agricultural Worker program for this purpose. See Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 303, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1160 (1996)).
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during the 1990s."9 This shift can be explained in the collective
nature of labor rights. The migrants that are the focus of this
Note are found in service, manufacturing, construction, food-
processing, and agriculture industries. When an occupation
becomes over-represented by these low-tier workers, conditions
worsen for all workers in the occupation. Therefore, the emer-
gence of more of these "brown collar"6° workers and their impact
on wages and conditions in the workplace has implications not
just for the well-being of these workers, an ever-growing minority,
but for the entire American workforce.61
Closely connected to taxes are the direct costs of the foreign-
born population. The health, welfare, and educational costs of
undocumented immigrant populations are an important and
growing part of public expenditures. Less than half of undocu-
mented employees are covered by medical insurance or worker's
compensation plans.62 If they are injured, they are replaced, not
treated, and they usually do not even receive their last
paycheck." Medicaid, however, provides health care coverage
for everyone, including undocumented persons, in emergency
care facilities.64
In a study of ten states, more than two billion dollars was
spent in 2002 for emergency Medicaid expenditures, though not
divided by citizenship status.65 Nevertheless, five of the ten states
studied reported data that points to the likelihood that at least
59. See James B. Parks, Recognizing Our Common Bonds, AMERICA@WoRK,
May 2000, available at http://www.aflcio.org/aboutaflcio/magazine/common
bonds.fm. In 1999, the AFL-CIO adopted a policy that called for better regula-
tion of legal immigration. "Once here, all workers, documented or undocu-
mented, should have full workplace rights to protect their own interests and the
rights of all American workers." Id. The previous policy, adopted in 1985,
"endorsed the creation of the current system of immigration enforcement,
which includes employer sanctions for hiring undocumented workers." Id.
60. Social scientists use the term "brown collar" worker to refer to a
recent (arrived in the United States within the past five years) Latino migrant
who works in an occupation in which Latinos are concentrated or over-repre-
sented. Leticia M. Saucedo, The Browning of the American Workplace: Protecting
Workers in Increasingly Latino-ized Occupations, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 303, 304
(2004).
61. Id.
62. HUDDLE, supra note 46.
63. Id.
64. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-472, UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS:
QUESTIONS PERSIST ABOUT THEIR IMPACT ON HOSPITALS' UNCOMPENSATED CARE
COSTS 9 (2004).
65. Id. at 10.
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half of the emergency expenditures were for labor services for
undocumented pregnant women.66
In addition, in fiscal year 1995, approximately $1.1 billion in
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and food
stamps were provided to households with an illegal undocu-
mented parent.67 Any child, regardless of immigration status, is
also eligible for free primary and secondary education under
Plyer v. Doe.68 The cost of admitting the 1.1 million school-aged
undocumented persons to primary and secondary schools in the
United States is about $7.6 billion.6 9 Thus, the health, welfare,
and educational costs of undocumented immigrant populations
are an important and growing part of public expenditures. Still,
Professor Ronald Lee, economist and principle author of the
National Academy of Science's fiscal analysis of immigration,
imparts that it would be misleading to calculate the school-aged,
native-born children as costs, but not to include the taxes paid by
those children when they enter the workforce.7 °
The above data illustrate an unsettled debate on the costs
and benefits of the undocumented population. While it is diffi-
cult to assess the actual economic benefit or detriment of this
population, there must also be consideration of the tremendous
idealistic value in having a dynamic migrant population. Many
proponents of a more liberalized immigration policy favor an
approach that is more accepting of the foreign-born as an affir-
mation of American ideals: inclusiveness, opportunities for self-
made success, and diversity. Under this approach, given that
many come to the United States believing in the American
Dream and with a desire to improve the lives of their families, 7 1 it
would be hypocritical and cruel to deny them the opportunity to
do so. There is a moral imperative to account for these values in
immigration policy. These value-based considerations will be
examined in this Note's conclusion.
This debate on undocumented migration is charged not
only because it involves the ability of Americans to work and earn
66. Id.
67. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-98-30, ILLEGAL ALIENS:
EXTENT OF WELFARE BENEFITS RECEIVED ON BEHALF OF U.S. CITIZEN CHILDREN 6
(1997).
68. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
69. According to the U.S. Department of Education, in 1999-2000 the
average cost per student for the United States was $6911. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2002, at 198
tbl.169 (2003), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d02/tables/
PDF/table169.pdf.
70. MYTHS AND FACTS, supra note 49, at 1-2.
71. Id. at 5.
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an honest wage, but also because this value is seemingly pitted
against the ability of others to pursue the American Dream. Rec-
ognizing that the existing immigration system is not meeting
many of these policy goals, Congress and the White House have
proposed policies that aim to provide benefits for all parties
involved. The next section will detail why the current immigra-
tion regime has not succeeded in achieving these multi-faceted
goals.
B. The United States Immigration System and the United States
Labor Market
For those undocumented persons who come to the United
States and remain illegally, this "decision" to be undocumented
must be understood in the context of a United States immigra-
tion system that provides few legal avenues for the admission of
workers to fulfill the demand in the United States economy for
less-skilled jobs. 72 The failure of legal American labor to respond
to this demand creates an incentive for undocumented migra-
tion to the United States.
Under the United States immigration regime, there are very
few employment-based visas for foreign-born workers in the less-
skilled categories. Of the five preference categories of visas for
permanent (as opposed to temporary or non-immigrant) status,
only one is for workers in less-skilled jobs. The relevant "third
preference" category allots only five thousand 73 visas each year to
workers in occupations that require less than two years of higher
education, training, or experience. About seventy-one percent of
Mexicans receiving an employment-based visa for permanent
immigration to the United States used this preference category
in 2001. TM
There is a similar numerical obstacle for those who seek to
work in low-skilled positions under a temporary employment-
based visa. Of the sixteen temporary visa categories, only two,
the H-2A and the H-2B are available to workers in fields that
72. Nearly a quarter of the undocumented population arrived in the
United States in the past five years, suggesting that the United States economy
has demanded workers during a period of rapid growth. See AMER. IMMIGRA-
TION LAW FOUND., IMMIGRATION POLICY REPORT: THE VALUE OF UNDOCUMENTED
WORKERS, THE NUMBERS BEHIND THE U.S.-MEXICO IMMIGRATION DEBATE (2002),
http://www.ailf.org/ipc/policy-reports-2002_value.asp.
73. Paral, supra note 39, at 4. The cap is set at ten thousand, but five
thousand visas are reserved each year for beneficiaries of the Nicaraguan
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), Pub. L. No. 105-110,
tit. II, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193 (1997). Paral, supra note 39, at 4 n.7.
74. Paral, supra note 39, at 4.
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require little or no training. Workers in less-skilled jobs received
only sixteen percent of all temporary employment and training
visas awarded in 2002. 75 Seventy-six percent of Mexicans receiv-
ing temporary work visas in 2002 were recipients of only H-2A or
H-2B visas, showing that Mexican workers have been squeezed
into visa categories in which there are few visas available.76
In addition to the employment-based visas discussed above,
the family-based immigration system presents a potential avenue
for those wanting to work in the United States. Unfortunately,
the family-based allotment system is inefficient, set to arbitrary
numbers, and governed by the complex "family preference" sys-
tem, which is characterized by lengthy waiting times depending
on what kind of relationship (spouse, unmarried child, etc.) the
petitioner has to either a United States citizen or a legal perma-
nent resident (LPR). The wait time in the case of a Mexican
national is currently seven to twelve years. Therefore, the family-
based immigration system is an ineffective means of supplying
labor that is currently in demand, and it comes as no surprise
that foreign nationals coming to the United States in response to
the strong economic demand for less-skilled labor come and
remain in the country without proper documentation.
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Respons-
ibility Act (IIRIRA) of 199617 added another level of complica-
tion. In an effort to discourage people from entering the United
States illegally or overstaying their visas, the new law instituted a
set of "bars" that, once triggered, prevent a person from entering
the United States again for another three or ten years. Those
who have been "unlawfully present"7" in the United States for
180 days or for one year are inadmissible for three years or ten
years, respectively. This law effectively discouraged people who
would otherwise travel back to their country of origin from doing
so, and encouraged them to remain, without legal status, in the
United States, for fear of triggering one of these bars upon their
return to the United States.79
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
78. A person is defined as "unlawfully present" if he or she "is present in
the United States after the expiration of the period of stay authorized by the
Attorney General or is present in the United States without being admitted or
paroled." Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a) (9) (B) (ii) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1182 (2005)).
79. In most cases, a return to the United States is inevitable, as this migra-
tion is cyclical, with migrants staying and working in the United States for a
discrete period, returning to their home country, and then returning to the
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The immigration system attempts to address some of these
complex labor issues while protecting American workers and, at
least in theory, discouraging the exploitation of undocumented
workers. In order for an unskilled worker to receive an employ-
ment-based ° (permanent) immigrant visa, under Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a) (5) (A), the employer must
obtain a labor certification from the Secretary of Labor, stating
that the immigrant's employment will neither displace nor other-
wise disadvantage American workers. 8
The temporary, nonimmigrant H-2 visa scheme likewise
required certification by the Secretary of Labor that "qualified
persons in the United States are not available" and that "the
employment of foreign workers will not adversely affect the
wages and working conditions of workers in the United States
similarly employed.
'8 2
United States again for more work. Eighty percent of Mexican migrants report
that they made no more than three trips to the United States. Three-quarters
stayed less than two years. See Douglas S. Massey, Five Myths About Immigration:
Common Misconceptions Underlying U.S. Border-Enforcement Policy, IMMIGRATION
POL'Y IN Focus, Aug. 2005, available at http://www.ailf.org/ipc/infocus/2005_
fivemyths.pdf. The growth of enforcement efforts has also had the perplexing
effect of both not reducing the inflow of people from Mexico and also reducing
the outflow of such persons. Increased border enforcement efforts have
pushed migration flows through more remote regions, tripling the death rate at
the border, increasing the cost to United States taxpayers and encouraging
undocumented persons to remain in the United States longer to recoup the
costs of entering. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEV, CATO INST., BACKFIRE AT THE BORDER:
WHY ENFORCEMENT WITHOUT LEGALIZATION CANNOT STOP ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
1 (2005), available at http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-029.pdf.
80. There are four employment-based "preferences" in the United States
immigration system, with unskilled workers qualifying under the third prefer-
ence. Within that preference, unskilled workers comprise one of three sub-
prongs of persons that can compete for no more than ten thousand employ-
ment-based visas.
81. Under INA § 212(a) (5) (A) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2005)), the
Secretary of Labor must certify that
(i) (1) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified
(or equally qualified in the case of an alien described in clause (ii))
and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the
United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such
skilled or unskilled labor, and
(II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages
and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly
employed.
Id.
82. Pub. L. No. 82-141, 66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1011
(a) (15) (H) (ii) (2000)). The relevant language reads:
[An H-2 nonimmigrant comes to the United States] (a) ... to perform
agricultural labor or services... of a temporary or seasonal nature, or
(b) . . . to perform other temporary service or labor if unemployed
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The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)13 of 1986
attempted to reduce the number of undocumented workers in
the United States. It divided the H-2 program into two sections:
the H2-A visa for agricultural workers and the H2-B for non-agri-
cultural labor. In addition to prohibiting the employment of
undocumented workers, the IRCA contains penalties for employ-
ers who knowingly employ individuals who are not authorized to
work in the United States, and provides sanctions to deter the
surreptitious entry of undocumented persons and overstays. s4
The Act is easily circumvented. Data from the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS)85 database showed that over a
twenty-month period (October 1996 to May 1998), the INS iden-
tified about fifty thousand unauthorized aliens who had used sev-
enty-eight thousand fraudulent documents to obtain
employment.8 6 The INS is stretching its resources to cover its
responsibilities. Since 1994, it has devoted only two percent of its
enforcement resources to worksite enforcement.8 7 The results of
the investigations are as might be expected. In fiscal year 1998,
for example, the INS completed about 6,500 employer investiga-
tions of about three percent of the country's estimated number
of employers of undocumented workers.8" More than eight out
of ten investigations completed during the period we reviewed
did not result in a penalty. 9 The INS instituted criminal pro-
ceedings in only two percent of the investigations." The wide-
persons capable of performing such service or labor cannot be found
in this country [except for foreign medical school graduates coming
to perform professional medical services].
Id.
83. Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (1986).
84. Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 686 (7th Cir. 2004).
85. Lawful and unlawful immigration is largely out of the effective control
of the United States Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS, formerly the
INS). As of March 1, 2003, the INS was transferred to the Department of
Homeland Security. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, § 441, 116 Stat. 2192
(2003) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 251 (Supp. 2003)). For convenience, the older
usage is employed here. The Department is still overwhelmed with work. See
Nina Bernstein, A Longer Wait for Citizenship and the Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, June 11,
2004, at Al (reporting a backlog of one hundred thousand petitions for citizen-
ship in New York City).
86. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-99-33, ILLEGAL ALIENS: SIc-
NIFICANT OBSTACLES TO REDUCING UNAUTHORIZED ALIEN EMPLOYMENT EXIST 12
(1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99033.pdf.
87. Id. at 3.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized Alien Employ-
ment Exist Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 5 (1999) (statement of
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spread use of fraudulent documentation makes it difficult to
prove the required knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt on the
part of the offending employers.9' In fact, the INS was only able
to collect one half of the criminal penalties it assessed, princi-
pally because of employer bankruptcy.92 In short, the govern-
ment alone through the INS, even supplemented by the FBI,
cannot do the job of curtailing undocumented migration, much
less meet its increased responsibilities since September 11 th.
The IRCA also contained two one-time amnesty provisions
that allowed undocumented workers to apply for permanent resi-
dent status if they could demonstrate either that they had been
present in the United States since 1982, or had at least ninety
days experience in qualifying agricultural work.93 The contro-
versy of the amnesties and dissatisfaction with the status quo94
has led many to push for a change in immigration policy.
III. POLITICAL PROPOSALS FOR THE IMMIGRATION/
LABOR DILEMMA
In order to mollify the costs associated with undocumented
migration, while at the same time harnessing the benefits of for-
eign-born workers to fill a need, the President and members of
Congress have announced policy proposals to reconcile these
priorities. Many of these policies deal specifically with how to
handle the demand for foreign low-skilled labor without hinder-
ing the American workforce.
President Bush called for a temporary guest worker scheme
in November 2005.15 The program would allow undocumented




93. William M. Ross, Note, The Road to H-2A and Beyond: An Analysis of
Migrant Worker Legislation in Agribusiness, 5 DRAKE J. AGiuc. L. 267, 275-76
(2000).
94. For example, enforcement of immigration laws at agricultural work-
sites, in particular, has been practically nonexistent. Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d
685, 695 (7th Cir. 2004); see discussion supra notes 83-89.
95. In January 2004, President Bush had proposed creating a large tem-
porary worker program to legalize present undocumented migrants and accom-
modate future entrants. Under that proposal, foreign-born persons willing to
work in jobs for which United States workers are scarce may be granted a three-
year work visa, which could be renewed for an additional three years. After
those six years, the workers would have to return home. Undocumented per-
sons currently in the United States would have to pay a registration fee to be
eligible. Congress responded with a number of alternatives, but none was
implemented. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary,
Fact Sheet: Fair and Secure Immigration Reform (Jan. 7, 2004), http://www.
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workers with jobs within the United States to obtain temporary
legal status, allowing United States employers with unfilled jobs
to hire foreign workers. After paying a one-time registration fee,
undocumented workers now in the United States would be able
to join the program. Those wanting to be part of the program
from abroad would not have to pay the fee. The program would
last for three years and be renewable, but the workers are
expected to return home once the program has ended, since
there is no path to citizenship, and there would be economic
incentives for the workers to return home. The Bush plan also
called for an annual increase in the number of legal immigrants
as well as increased enforcement against companies that hire
undocumented persons illegally.9 6 Of the ten million un-docu-
mented persons in the United States, perhaps forty percent
would be eligible for these green cards.9 7 The Bush proposal
includes many enforcement provisions, including increased
resources toward worksite enforcement, interior repatriation and
increasing the number of beds in detention facilities as a mean
of avoiding the "catch and release" of undocumented persons.
The President's proposal did not receive wide popular sup-
port," with some viewing it as providing amnesty to those who
had violated the law. Competing versions in Congress include
the Kennedy-McCain and Cornyn-Kyl proposals. The Kennedy-
McCain proposal embraces the "three-legged stool" approach of
the 1986 IRCA: enforcement, employer sanctions, and legal-iza-
tion. Under Kennedy-McCain, undocumented persons living in
the United States would have to pay a fine, and then could apply
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040107-1.html. The President
announced a new proposal in November 2005. Press Release, White House
Office of the Press Secretary, White House Outlines President's Immigration
Reform Proposal (Nov. 29, 2005), http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2005/
Nov/29-920905.html.
96. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet:
Securing America Through Immigration Reform (Nov. 28, 2005), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051128-3.htm1.
97. Paul Magnusson, Mi Casa Es Su Casa? Get Real, Bus. WK., Jan. 10, 2005,
at 39.
98. In a November 2005 Gallup poll, sixty-five percent of the participants
disapproved of the President's handling of immigration issues, while twenty-six
percent approved. In a Gallup poll from June 2005, sixty-one percent of
respondents said that immigration is good for the country with thirty-four per-
cent saying that it is not. Forty-six percent said they would like to see immigra-
tion decreased and forty-nine percent said the presence of recent immigrants
holds down wages for American workers. See Poll: Bush Immigration Stance Unpop-
ular, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Dec. 6, 2005, available at http://www.sciencedaily.
com/upi/?feed=TopNews&article=UPI-1-20051206-12300500-bc-us-gallup-
immigration.xml.
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for status under a new temporary non-immigrant category, H-B5,
during which the applicant could not change status for six years.
After that period, he would be allowed to adjust to a legal perma-
nent residence from within the United States. The Kennedy-
McCain proposal also provides an increased number of employ-
ment-based visas and exempts immediate relatives of United
States citizens from the annual cap on family-based visas.99
The Cornyn-Kyl bill does not have a direct path to citizen-
ship and has a greater emphasis on enforcement, both along the
border and in the workplace. This proposal would create incen-
tives for foreign-born workers to return home and would
increase the cap on employment-based and family-based visas.' °
Most recently, the Senate Judiciary has introduced a bill that
incorporates a guest worker program into the impending immi-
gration reforms. While the bill Senator Arlen Specter intro-
duced initially kept several of the enforcement mechanisms
articulated in the House bill, the compromise that came out of
the Judiciary Committee contains provisions that allow undocu-
mented persons to legalize their status if certain conditions are
met.
10
These guest worker proposals share a common goal of eas-
ing the ability of foreign laborers to work in the United States
while at the same time attempting to check the amount of dam-
age this presence does to the American worker by limiting how
long such workers are able to remain working in the United
States.
There are many critics of these proposals, with some allud-
ing to the failed Bracero program'0 2 and the IRCA amnesties,'0°
which were followed by increased illegal migration to the United
99. S. 1033 was introduced on May 12, 2005, and has been referred to the
Senate Judiciary Committee. Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act, S.
1033, 109th Cong. (2005). See also AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS'N, SIDE BY
SIDE ANALYSIS OF SENATE IMMIGRATION REFORM BILLS (2006), available at http://
www.nclr.org/content/resources/detail/36304/.
100. See id.
101. See discussion infra CONCLUSION.
102. The United States has used foreign labor to fill a demand since
before World War II. Concerns about labor shortages, primarily in the agricul-
tural sector, were the impetus for the Emergency Farm Labor (Bracero) Pro-
gram in 1942. This bilateral agreement between the United States and Mexico
brought Mexican workers to the United States to perform seasonal agricultural
labor, and then return to Mexico. This program included protections, such as
payment at the prevailing rate, guaranteed work for at least seventy-five percent
of the contract period, protection against discriminatory acts, guaranteed trans-
portation, housing, food, repatriation, and exemption from American military
service. However, before admittance to the United States, the War Manpower
Commission would certify both the existence of a labor shortage and the pre-
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States. This history has led to claims that any guest worker pro-
gram would not only be seen as an amnesty for those who have
migrated illegally, but would encourage further migration of
undocumented persons into the United States.
Opponents of guest worker programs may contend that the
presence of foreigners willing to do work for low wages always
hurts Americans and that wages would increase if only there were
no undocumented workers willing to do the jobs for less. This is
economically flawed, however, as industries that could not sus-
tain a higher wage would simply move overseas or dissolve
entirely.1
0 4
vailing wage rate. See Alice J. Baker, Agricultural Guestworker Programs in the
United States, 10 TEX. Hlsp. J.L. & POL'y 79, 83 (2004).
The Bracero Program continued even after the end of World War II,
despite having been nominally instituted in response to wartime labor
shortages. In 1947, the program ceased to be a bilateral agreement between
governments and became a private matter between the worker and grower. See
Maria Elena Bickerton, Note, Prospects for a Bilateral Immigration Agreement with
Mexico: Lessons from the Bracero Program, 79 TEX. L. REv. 895, 897 (2001). The
corresponding reduced oversight was accompanied by worsening foreign con-
tract worker exploitation. See MAE M. NGA, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL
ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 131 (2004). The program was
amended in 1949 in an attempt to stem illegal immigration by giving a hiring
preference to undocumented workers already in the United States. In 1951,
the program returned to government administration, with the provision that
the Labor Secretary needed to certify that a shortage of domestic workers
existed and that the use of foreign workers would not adversely affect wages and
working conditions of similarly situated domestic workers, and that the
employer had tried to hire domestic laborers. During its existence, the Bracero
was criticized for displacing domestic workers, attracting illegal immigration
and for promulgating the exploitation of foreign workers. See Bickerton, supra,
at 907-08. Consequently, the Bracero Program was allowed to expire in 1964.
Id. at 897.
103. Within eighteen months of the IRCA becoming effective, 1.3 million
undocumented farm workers applied for amnesty under the Act's Special Agri-
cultural Workers Program. See B. LINDSAY LOWELL & ROBERT SURO, How MANY
UNDOCUMENTED: THE NUMBERS BEHIND THE U.S.-MExICO MIGRATION TALKS 4
(2002), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/6.pdf.
104. One recent New York Times analysis suggested that, by raising farm
worker wages forty percent, the farming industry could bring its workers above
the poverty line. John M. Broder, Immigrants and the Economics of Hard Work,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2006, at 3. This analysis is flawed; raising the wage would
add a cost to doing business for the farm owners who could likely see their
foreign competition as too cheap to compete at reduced profit margins. The
result would be no farm and no farm workers (American or otherwise). See also
Daniel B. Wood, A Drought of Farm Labor, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 2,
2005, at 1 (describing how the lack of temporary farm labor has resulted in
losses of tens of millions of dollars to California and Arizona farmers: "I lost
$250,000 because of [being short of workers] last year. This year I am con-
cerned I could go under completely. If I miss making my contracts with some
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Undocumented migration to the United States will occur as
long as there is demand for the kind of labor Americans seem
unwilling or unable to do.1 0 5 As long as it is inexpensive and easy
to find, employers will use and depend on foreign labor.106 This
is a good thing, both for foreign laborers who desire any job and
for Americans who do not want to compete with wage-lowering
foreign labor for their jobs.
The guest worker proposals are not the only political
options that pundits have suggested to protect American labor
from the economic effects of undocumented immigration. The
United States could shut its borders, but this presents many
moral dilemmas for a nation that celebrates immigrants and
diversity. A complete shut down of the borders would also be an
of the big stores, they could look to China, Canada, Mexico and elsewhere, and
even if I recover my labor later, it may be too late.") Id. at 10. See also Lisa
Takeuchi et al., What it Means for Your Wallet, TIME, Apr. 10, 2006, at 43 ("By
taking the least desirable jobs, says [economist] John Kasarda. . . . '[immi-
grants] have kept some industries competitive that would have gone to Mexico
and China."'). Id.
105. The belief that there are jobs that "Americans are unwilling to do"
generates much debate. A piece in the New York Times recently called this idea a
"myth" and produced statistics that show that in the jobs where undocumented
persons are highly concentrated (that is, more than 4.9 percent of the overall
workforce), they still make up the vast majority. According to these statistics,
undocumented persons make up only twenty-four percent of the farming,
fishering, and forestry industry; fifteen percent of the cleaning industry; four-
teen percent of the construction industry; twelve percent of food preparers;
nine percent of the manufacturing industry, and seven percent of transporta-
tion workers, while the rest of American workers. Broder, supra note 104, at 3.
These numbers do not suggest that undocumented persons taking "unwanted"
jobs is a myth; rather, the economic reality is that undocumented persons take
the jobs in industries in which the supply of American workers does not meet
the demand. For the purposes of the analysis here, and also for the analysis
that is relevant to the ongoing debate about legalizing undocumented workers,
it is of little, if any, economic importance whether Americans make up a major-
ity or minority of workers in an industry; if American workers are not supplying
what is demanded, undocumented workers will be used to make up the
difference.
106. Some commentators suggest that it is unrealistic to discuss com-
pletely eliminating undocumented workers from the American workplace. See
Howard Goldfarb, The Undocumented Worker: Fuller, Holmes, and the Bush Proposal
Within Immigration and Labor Law Jurisprudence, 16 U. FLA.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 179,
189 (2005).
Some observers have conceded that the United States will always have
some level of undocumented workers so long as neighboring coun-
tries allow many of their citizens to live in poverty. It is also widely
thought that tracking down all current undocumented workers and
deporting them to their respective homeland would prove too costly
and arduous, and is thus not a realistic solution. (citations omitted).
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obstacle for businesses in the service and agricultural industries
that benefit from the use of undocumented, foreign-born labor,
and therefore is not a very practical proposal.
10 7
A long-term solution might involve restructuring United
States foreign aid to promoting sustainable agriculture, develop-
ment, and foreign assistance, but that would be costly, both polit-
ically and financially, and the results would not be seen for at
least a few generations. Moreover, it is not undeveloped coun-
tries that are a large source of the influx of foreign-born, but
rather, developing countries are the largest source of emigra-
tion. 'O Therefore, thoughtful foreign assistance will be part of a
comprehensive approach, but would not be effective in address-
ing the issues articulated here.
Stronger and/or more penalties imposed on employers may
curb future employment of undocumented persons. However,
this would impose a heavy burden on employers to determine
prospective workers' immigration status and may be too costly for
employers. In addition, it is probably unrealistic to expect
employers, competing in the global marketplace, to adhere to
such labor regulations.10 9 Further, such actions would be
impractical in the context of often consensual (even if illegal)
employer and migrant relationships.
Another drastic option is that with greater funding and
resources, the INS/USCIS could conduct raids on un-docu-
mented workers, fine them, and send them back to their coun-
tries of origin. This approach would be difficult, given the
complexity of determining who is entitled to a particular immi-
gration status, time consuming, ineffective, and unpopular both
with industry representatives and with voters in historically immi-
grant-friendly areas. 10
107. Id.
108. Massey, supra note 79, at 3-4.
109. Don Villarejo, Are Migration and Free Trade Appropriate Forms of Eco-
nomic Development? The Case of Mexico and U.S. Agriculture, 9 U.C. DAvisJ. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 175, 189-95 (2003) (describing how employers evade "knowingly"
employing undocumented workers by not scrutinizing their employees' fraudu-
lent identification documents).
110. In 1999, the INS implemented Operation Vanguard, in which meat-
packing plants in all of Nebraska and three counties in Iowa were the site of a
systematic effort to enforce employer sanctions, that section of the 1986 Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act that prohibits employers from hiring undocu-
mented workers. Using Social Security records, the operation compared
employment records with the national database. In all, the INS sifted out 4762
names out of 24,310 workers for interviews regarding their questionable
records. Of the 1000 who showed up to interview, only 34 were deported for
lacking the correct legal papers. The INS declared success, estimating that the
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A blanket amnesty allowing all undocumented persons in
the United States to gain citizenship would be the most effective
means of moving people from the undocumented to the docu-
mented category. Many critics decry such a concept as rewarding
illegal behavior.1  An amnesty also raises fairness issues, as there
are many people who have patiently waited in line while pursing
available legal channels, who may ultimately be denied admit-
tance to the United States.
Some commentators suggest that the United States should
make more visas available for those who want to work on a tem-
porary or permanent basis. The current limit of permanent resi-
dent visas available to Mexicans is twenty thousand.112 Given that
Mexico is so geographically and historically close to the United
States, and so economically integrated with the American econ-
omy, this limit has yielded long waiting times, even for those who
are legally qualified, practically guaranteeing undocumented
migration.
One specific legislative proposal that has recently gained
inertia by passing the House of Representatives is Judiciary Com-
mittee Chairman Sensenbrenner's H.R. 4437113 Border Protec-
tion, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of
2005.114 Considered a victory for proponents of stricter enforce-
ment, this bill criminalizes undocumented immigration status,
limits the federal judiciary's ability to review immigration deci-
sions and turns many minor crimes into aggravated felonies,
other 3000 or so who failed to appear left their jobs out of fear. Following the
operation, industry representatives set up meetings with the INS to discuss the
labor shortages caused by Operation Vanguard. One observer from United
Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) said of the operation, "The disruption
from Operation Vanguard is certainly fuel for the political fire supporting
guestworker [sic]. We know the employers really want this. It's a very serious
and immediate threat." David Bacon, INS Declares War on Labor, THE NATION,
Oct. 25, 1999, at 19, 23.
111. Peter Prengaman, Senate Majority Leader Against Amnesty Program for
Illegals, NCTIMES (San Diego), Feb. 22, 2006, http://www.nctimes.com/arti-
cles/2006/02/22/news/state/13_33352_21_06.txt (quoting Senate Majority
Leader Bill Frist as stating, "I oppose amnesty. Immigrants are important to our
history, our economy, and are greatly valued by our country, but at the same
time, our focus will be on the rule of law.").
112. One commentator suggests increasing the number of permanent
resident visas available to Mexican residents to one hundred thousand per year.
Massey, supra note 79, at 11.
113. The Senate will next consider its own version of the bill in March
2006. Senate Judiciary Chairman Arlen Specter's draft version includes a provi-
sion for a guest worker program.
114. H.R. 4437 was passed by the House of Representatives on December
16, 2005. H.R. 4437 109th Cong. (2005).
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which, for undocumented persons, triggers the worst punish-
ments, including removal. Bill provisions would create a new
"dangerous alien" detention ground, permitting indefinite
detention of aliens who cannot be removed. Another controver-
sial amendment gives local authorities the ability to apprehend
and detain illegal migrants. Including a provision to eliminate
the visa lottery, this bill marks the first time since 1924 that either
chamber has voted to reduce the amount of legal immigra-
tion.' 15 This bill would also include increased penalties on
employers for hiring undocumented workers and would require
employers to electronically verify employees' work eligibility.
The bill did not contain a guest worker provision.' 16
The Sensenbrenner bill was not welcomed by immigration
advocates, who view the legislation as draconian, unnecessary,
and detrimentally harsh on both good faith would-be legal
residents and their advocates. Under the bill's provisions to
criminalize individuals and organizations assisting undocu-
mented persons, social workers, counselors, and lawyers support-
ing or representing undocumented persons, for example, under
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA),' 17 would be
prosecutable as criminals." i
The Senate bills, which will be discussed in the Conclusion,
have taken a very different approach to the issue by incorporat-
ing guest worker programs in its immigration reform proposals.
Additionally, the Cornyn-Kyl and Specter Senate proposals do
not contain the strict enforcement and punitive provisions of the
Sensenbrenner bill.
Any policy must address the ethical issues involving the
nearly ten million undocumented persons currently in the
115. The visa diversity lottery provides fifty thousand visas to qualified
persons. The purpose of the lottery, created in 1990, is to ensure that new
immigrants to the United States reflect the broad spectrum of nationalities
interested in immigrating to the United States.
116. H.R. 4437.
117. Under Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994, Pub. L. 103-
322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994), an individual can self-petition for legal status
in the United States. This ability to self-petition enables a person who, because
of the existence of an abusive relationship with the would-be petitioner (usually
a spouse or an ex-spouse, who is a legal permanent resident or a United States
citizen), to not have to depend on that abusive relationship to gain legal status.
Often, while going through the steps of filing and waiting for a VAWA petition
to be decided, the petitioner is out of status.
118. Several large protests have taken place around the country since the
Sensenbrenner bill was passed. In April 2006, hundreds of thousands of people
participated in protests against the tough punitive provisions of the Sensen-
brenner bill. See Dan Baltz & Darryl Fears, Pro-Immigration Rallies are Held Across
Country, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2006, at Al.
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United States. While these persons are in the United States ille-
gally, often deciding to come to improve their and their families'
welfare by taking jobs that Americans are not willing to fill, they
have committed a civil infraction, not a criminal act. Amnesty
may not be fair, but neither is summary removal. This is further
complicated when such undocumented persons have had chil-
dren in the United States, who would face abandonment (or an
involuntary relinquishment of their American livelihood) if the
parent were removed.
There are many considerations behind these proposals,
which are difficult to evaluate given the relatively undetermined
nature of the undocumented population. One way of balancing
policy objectives would call for limiting the jobs available for
short-term, foreign-born migrants to just the jobs that Americans
and legal residents are not willing to do at economically sustaina-
ble wages. As will be discussed in the following section, the RICO
cause of action against those who hire undocumented workers
strives for this balance. 1 9
IV. USING RICO TO PROTECT AMERICAN WORKERS
This Note will argue that a judicial tool, the RICO statute, is
an available and effective mechanism that can achieve some of
the aims of political policy proposals regarding undocumented
workers. This section will describe how the statute works gener-
ally and then apply it to the undocumented worker context and
the underlying circuit split, recently taken up by the Supreme
Court. This Note will then analyze the implications of these fed-
eral court decisions and the use of RICO in this context by a
broad base of workers, competitors, and local government.
A. RICO Background
In 1970, Congress enacted RICO to deal with "enterprise
criminality." 2° To plead a RICO claim, a plaintiff must allege:
(1) conduct; (2) of an enterprise; (3) through a pattern; (4) of
119. The economic analysis of the RICO cause of action is different when
it is the government acting as the plaintiff. In that case, the injury is the cost to
the taxpayers of supporting undocumented persons, whereas in suits by private
entities, the damage is the loss of wages.
120. United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1983) ("enter-
prise criminality" consists of "all types of organized criminal behavior [ranging]
from simple political corruption to sophisticated white-collar schemes to tradi-
tional Mafia-type endeavors.") (citations omitted).
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racketeering activity. l'2 RICO makes it unlawful to conduct or
conspire to conduct an enterprise related to interstate commerce
during which racketeering activities are agreed to or committed.
All criminal and civil RICO cases require allegations and proof of
a RICO enterprise. 122 The federal courts' interpretation of the
RICO enterprise requirement, therefore, has enormous signifi-
cance for RICO's usefulness to both private and government
plaintiffs.
Congress used in RICO "a generality and adaptability [of
language] comparable to that found to be desirable in constitu-
tional provisions. " 12 Congress "drafted RICO broadly enough to
encompass a wide range of criminal activity, taking many differ-
ent forms and likely to attract a broad array of perpetrators oper-
ating in many different ways.
'
"124
The Supreme Court has recognized that RICO applies to a
broad spectrum of criminal enterprises. 25 "The occasion for
Congress' action was the perceived need to combat organized
crime. But Congress[,] for cogent reasons[,] chose to enact a
more general statute .... "126 RICO creates "a private enforce-
ment mechanism that ... deter[s] violators and deprive [s] them
of the fruits of their illegal actions, and . . .provide[s] ample
compensation to the victims of [RICO] violations." 127 Congress
wanted private citizens to use the law to obtain the relief that the
121. Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2004). See also G.
Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v.
Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237 n.150 (1982).
122. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2006); Williams v. Mohawk Indus., 411 F.3d
1252, 1256 (2005) ("These requirements apply whether the RICO claim is civil
or criminal in nature.").
123. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933).
124. HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248-49 (1989).
125. Defendants in RICO litigation often question whether RICO applies
beyond "organized crime" in the Mafia sense of the word, as if "white-collar
crime" were not sometimes "organized." To be sure, a "purpose of RICO" was
to combat "organized crime," but that specific purpose was not its "only" pur-
pose. "[A]lthough the legislative history of RICO vividly demonstrates that it
was primarily enacted to combat organized crime, nothing in that history, or in
the language of the statute itself, expressly limits RICO's use to members of
organized crime." Owl Constr. Co. v. Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc., 727 F.2d
540, 542 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Uni Oil, Inc., 646 F.2d 946,
953 (5th Cir. 1981)). "[C]ommentators have persuasively and exhaustively
explained why the RICO statute [does] not require [such a showing]." Id. (cita-
tions omitted). Accordingly, RICO fits well into the typical pattern of federal
legislation aimed at a particular problem, but drafted in all-purpose language.
126. Nat'l Org. of Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 260 (1994).
127. Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) (citing Pfizer,
Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 313-14 (1978)); Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549,
557-58 (2000) ("'[P]rivate attorneys general' dedicated to eliminating racke-
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Justice Department and the INS, given their limited resources,
cannot be expected to provide. 128 Moreover, like the anti-trust
statutes, "RICO is to be read broadly." '29 Indeed, RICO makes its
principle of liberal construction a matter of express statutory lan-
guage, 130 rendering it applicable not only in the immigration
context, but in an array of labor disputes.
RICO has been used in various types of labor-management
disputes, 131 including strike and union litigation. In 1996, Con-
gress added immigration predicates to RICO, including trans-
porting or harboring undocumented persons, aiding such
persons to illegally enter the United States, or fraudulently using
visas, permits, and other immigration documents. These predi-
cates were added to aid law enforcement by energizing the
enforcement of provisions of the immigration statutes by the suit
of private attorneys general.
The federal courts have heard cases trying to use these pred-
icates in actions against employers that use undocumented for-
eign labor to the detriment of their legal workforce. The
Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have handed down
decisions that follow the law as written by Congress, allowing
legal workers to sue for wages lost when employers engage in cer-
tain systematic hiring of undocumented workers. The Seventh
Circuit's decision in Baker v. IBP, which was denied review by the
Supreme Court, threatens this movement towards holding
employers accountable for the use of undocumented foreign
labor through its decision on enterprise liability and "exclusive
right" to sue.1 32 A subsequent Eleventh Circuit decision in Wil-
liams v. Mohawk followed the earlier cases and conflicts with the
Seventh Circuit's enterprise holding in rejecting Mohawk's argu-
ment that a corporation and its agents are not sufficiently distinct
teering activity"; "The provision for treble damages is accordingly justified by
the expected benefit of suppressing racketeering.").
128. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 151
(1987) ("Both [RICO and the anti-trust statutes] bring to bear the pressure of
'private attorneys general' on a serious national problem for which public
prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate ....").
129. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985). See also
Am. Society of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 568-69
(1982).
130. Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-
452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2000)).
131. One scholar suggests that Congress remove the ability of private par-
ties to bring RICO suits in labor-management disputes because it is disruptive of
the labor-management relationship. Raymond P. Green, The Application of
RICO to Labor-Management and Employment Disputes, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 309
(1995).
132. Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2004).
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to form an enterprise and that a corporation's "routine business
conduct" cannot constitute participation in the enterprise; the
Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review these questions in
Mohawk.l3 3 The analysis that follows will explain why the Seventh
Circuit was incorrect in its holding and how it threatens the
development of this use of the law to protect workers (both docu-
mented and undocumented).
B. The Circuit Split
In 2004, a meat-packing company, IBP, Inc. (IBP), used
third party organizations to help it find illegal aliens to work in
its plants. 134 Former employees brought a class action lawsuit on
behalf of all persons legally authorized to be employed in the
United States and hired as hourly wage earners at that particular
facility in the past several years. The plaintiffs were employed
lawfully as hourly-paid employees of IBP's Joslin, Illinois, meat-
packing facility. The workers were unionized, and their wages
were set by a collective bargaining agreement between IBP and
the union. The collective bargaining agreement was silent as to
the question of employing undocumented workers."3 5 This puta-
tive class action was brought under RICO for injury to their prop-
erty.3 6 because their wage rates were depressed as a result of
IBP's scheme for the employment of an unlawful workforce. The
plaintiffs argued that IBP had been engaged in a policy of know-
ingly employing undocumented, illegal immigrants for unskilled
positions in an effort to reduce labor costs by driving down
employee wages.
The essence of the complaint was that the plaintiffs' wages
would have been higher had IBP not engaged in a scheme to
employ unauthorized employees; that is, had IBP not illegally
expanded the labor market to include unauthorized workers who
were willing to work at depressed wages and benefits, labor sup-
ply would have been lower and equilibrium wages higher.
3 7
133. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., 411 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2005), cert.
granted, 126 S.Ct. 830 (2005).
134. This is not IBP's first run-in with the law with regards to its hiring of
undocumented workers. IBP's meat-packing plants were the site of the INS's
Operation Vanguard, an attempt by the INS to crack down on the hiring of
illegal aliens. See supra note 108.
135. Baker, 357 F.3d at 689 ("[T]o hire illegal aliens is not a... subject of
collective bargaining ....").
136. "Lost wages" are "property" under RICO. Jund v. Town of Hemp-
stead, 941 F.2d 1271, 1286 (2d Cir. 1991).
137. See supra Part II for data on the effect of the employment of illegal
immigrants.
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IBP's "illegal immigrant hiring scheme" violated RICO, which
makes certain violations of Section 274 of the INA predicate
offenses. 3 ' The plaintiffs alleged that: (1) the IBP scheme vio-
lated Section 274 of the INA and RICO,"3 9 and (2) they were
proximately injured by receiving wages that were depressed, that
is, below what they would have been in a lawful labor market.
The plaintiffs "allege [d] that IBP ... expanded the pool of availa-
ble labor and thus depressed the price that labor can command.
When supply rises and demand is constant, price falls."' 4°
" [W]ages . . . [were] depressed by about $4 per hour ... -
The Seventh Circuit decided that this argument failed.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Baker is in conflict with
"enterprise" decisions in other circuits in several other litigation
scenarios, two of which will be discussed here: (1) illegal immi-
gration and (2) organized crime. Because this is an important
question of statutory interpretation at the heart of the employer-
employee relationship in the context of undocumented migra-
tion, this split in the circuits has important implications for the
future of immigration policy.
1. Illegal Immigration Litigation
The Seventh Circuit's decision clashes with the Second Cir-
cuit in Commercial Cleaning Services, LLC v. Colin Service Systems,
Inc."' In Commercial, a group of office cleaning companies sued
competitor Colin under RICO for commercial injury caused by
138. Section 274 of the INA is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2006). In
1996, Congress enacted § 203 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act, 104 Pub. L. No. 208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (3) (A)) (2006), which amended § 274 of the INA to prohibit
the employment of illegal aliens. Later that year, Congress enacted the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 433, 110 Stat.
1274 (1996), which, inter alia, added the amended § 274 to RICO. These predi-
cates were added "to help Federal law enforcement officials" because groups "in
this country, with ties to others abroad .... [had] developed to prey upon ille-
gal immigrants who want to come to the United States." 141 CONG. REc. H1588
(daily ed. Feb. 10, 1995) (statement of Rep. McCollum). Concern was also
expressed over the high costs imposed by illegal immigration on the State and
federal welfare and corrections systems. For remarks of the various Members of
Congress on this issue, see id.
139. The Seventh Circuit expressed skepticism about the "accuracy" of
the allegations in the Complaint. Baker, 357 F.3d at 687 (commenting that if
the allegations were "true, managers at IBP ... [had] committed hundreds of
felonies," and wondered, if they were true, why the "United States ... [had] not
commenced a criminal prosecution."). Id.
140. Baker, 357 F.3d at 689-90.
141. Id. at 687.
142. 271 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2001).
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Colin's alleged illegal immigrant hiring scheme. The plaintiffs
alleged that this scheme allowed the defendant company to
reduce costs and underbid the plaintiffs on new contracts. The
Second Circuit found no reason to object to an association-in-fact
enterprise described, in relevant part, as:
Colin is part of an enterprise composed of entities associ-
ated-in-fact that includes employment placement ser-
vices [ . .] and "various immigrant networks that assist
fellow illegal immigrants in obtaining employment, hous-
ing and illegal work permits." [ .... ] It alleges that Colin's
participation in the affairs of the enterprise through the
illegal immigrant hiring scheme violates 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a), which prohibits hiring certain undocumented
aliens, and which is a RICO predicate offense if committed
for financial gain.'
43
The enterprise in Baker is indistinguishable from that one
alleged in Commercial Cleaning, i.e., the defendant and others that
assist it in recruiting illegal workers.14 4
The Second Circuit found only one defect in the RICO
claim, a failure to plead the required state of mind in the com-
mission of the predicate offenses.14 5 Yet, as in Baker, defendant
Colin, presumably
want[ed] to pay lower wages; the recruiters [that is, the
employment placement services] want[ed] to be paid more
for services rendered (though . . . [Colin] would [have]
lik[ed] to pay them less); the ... [various immigrant net-
works that assisted fellow illegal immigrants] want[ed] to




144. The Commercial Cleaning Service, LLC enterprise contained other enti-
ties, but they were, in the words of Baker, "agents and employees" in the illegal
scheme that composed the enterprise, which it believed came "perilously close"
to violating the holding of Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923,
934 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp., 116 F.3d 225, 226-28
(7th Cir. 1997) that "a large, reputable manufacturer . . . plus its dealers and
other agents (or any subset of the members of the corporate family) do not
constitute an enterprise .... ). The differences, therefore, are not material.
145. Commercial Cleaning Serv., 271 F.3d at 387. The court noted that the
complaint was deficient in that it failed to plead "that Colin had actual knowl-
edge that the -llegal aliens it hired were brought into the county in violation of
the [immigration] statute."
146. Baker, 357 F.3d at 691.
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If Baker's analysis is required by RICO, and it is not, Commercial
Cleaning was wrongly decided, and it is not.
147
The Baker decision is further called into question in light of
the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Williams v. Mohawk Industries.
1 48
In Mohawk,1 49 employees sued their employer for allegedly violat-
ing the immigration laws in a scheme to hire and harbor illegal
workers to a Georgia carpet mill in order to suppress the wages
of legal workers. The complaint alleges, as in Baker, that Mohawk
committed this conduct as a member of an "association-in-fact"
enterprise consisting of Mohawk and third-party recruit-ing firms
that provide Mohawk with illegal, undocumented workers.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), the plaintiff, or prosecutor, in
criminal cases, must demonstrate that the defendant participated
in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Both
the language of the statute and the Supreme Court have
required allegations and proof of two distinct entities: (1) the
RICO person and (2) the enterprise. 150 In Mohawk, the plaintiffs
named Mohawk as the defendant person and alleged that
Mohawk had participated in an association-in-fact enterprise con-
sisting of Mohawk and third-party recruiters who supplied the
defendant company with illegal workers. Mohawk in its defense
argued that there is an agency relationship between a corpora-
tion named as the RICO person and the other members of the
enterprise, which defeats the statute's distinctness requirement.
Further, Mohawk argued that its alleged partici-pation in such an
enterprise amounted to nothing more than its own "ordinary
business activity," rather than participation in a separate
enterprise.
147. For that matter, Baker's analysis does not reflect general organiza-
tional theory. The Baker opinion mistakenly confuses the goals of members of an
organization (personal goals) with the goals of the organization (collective
goals). EDWARD GROSS & AMITAI ETZOINI, ORGANIZATIONS IN SOCIETY 8-13
(1985). If Baker's analysis were correct, "divergent [personal] goals" among
members of a putative organization would preclude the existence of any organi-
zations in society (under RICO or otherwise), since they could not have any
common or collective goals.
148. 411 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court granted
Mohawk's petition for certiorari on December 12, 2005. Williams v. Mohawk
Indus., 126 S.Ct. 830 (2005).
149. Although in earlier cases, such as Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Gutzman, 116
S.W.2d 233 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), and Commercial Cleaning Serv., the plain-
tiffs initially lost motions to dismiss and obtained reversals on appeal, the plain-
tiffs in Mohawk are the first to have survived a preliminary motion to dismiss at
the trial court level, affirmed in the Eleventh Circuit.
150. See Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161-62
(2001).
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It is well established that an association-in-fact enterprise
may consist entirely of either a group of corporations and other
legal entities or a group of corporations and individuals.
Mohawk, seeking a Baker-like result, argued that its relationship
with recruiting firms was nothing more than "ordinary business
activity." However, Mohawk's argument and attempt to limit the
statute's provisions is inconsistent with the language of the stat-
ute, as neither the terms nor the concept of agency appears in
the relevant RICO provisions and, more meaningfully, is directly
at odds with the statute's basic purposes. These imperatives led
the Court in Cedric Kushner to reject a similar attempt to limit
section 1962(c) based on the very same arguments concerning
the inability of corporations to act through their agents.'
2. Organized Crime
The Seventh Circuit's Baker decision also conflicts with
RICO litigation involving organized crime. RICO's "legislative
history clearly demonstrates that ... [it] was intended to provide
new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon organ-
ized crime .... "152 Any construction of RICO thatjeopardizes its
core purpose cannot be correct. Yet, if the Seventh Circuit's
Baker decision, in holding that an internal dispute signifies the
end of the necessary enterprise, is uniformly applied across associ-
ation-in-fact enterprises,15 then organized crime prosecutions
are in serious jeopardy. For example, the Second Circuit in
United States v. Orena15 4 faced a RICO prosecution in the context
of an internal war between opposing factions of the Colombo
Family of the Cosa Nostra.
Orena challenged his RICO convictions, arguing that the
enterprise allegation was "schizophrenic." '155 The indictment
alleged: "The members and associates of the Colombo Organ-
ized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra ('Colombo family') consti-
tuted an 'enterprise' as that term is described in Title 18, United
States Code, Sections 1961 (4) .... that is, a group of individuals
151. Id. at 165-66.
152. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983).
153. RICO's crucial concepts are to be uniformly applied. See, e.g., Reves
v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177-86 (1993) (reading "conduct" identically in
its verb and noun form in RICO); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMa-
hon, 482 U.S. 220, 239 (1987) ("a 'pattern' for civil purposes is a 'pattern' for
criminal purposes" under RICO) (citation omitted). Cf Northern Sec. Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197, 401 (1904) (anti-trust) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("The words cannot be read one way in a suit which is to end in fine and impris-
onment and another way in one which seeks an injunction.").
154. 32 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 1994).
155. Id. at 709.
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associated in fact."1 5'  The Circuit rejected Orena's arguments,
stating: "The existence of an internal dispute does not signal the
end of the enterprise ....
The conflict between Baker and organized crime prosecu-
tions is not limited to association-in-fact enterprises that reflect
internal disputes. The Seventh Circuit also believed that the per-
son IBP was not "distinct" from the enterprise IBP and its
recruiters. Under the person-enterprise rule, a distinction must
exist between the "person" and the "enterprise." If no distinc-
tion can be drawn, the two concepts collapse, and the pleading is
improper for a failure to plead distinct entities. The Seventh Cir-
cuit held that no distinctness is present between a corporation
and its subsidiaries and employees. 58 Thus, the Baker court
thought that the enterprise alleged here was such a family of cor-
porations under common ownership. 159 But in any conspiracy, its
members are bound by the common purpose of the conspiracy.
This makes the conspirators "partners" of each other. 160 If the
Seventh Circuit's analysis were correct, then no association-in-
fact enterprise could ever exist, because they would all be swal-
lowed up by the "distinctness" requirement. Hence, Baker is in
conflict with the legion of organized crime prosecutions from
other circuits in which the association-in-fact enterprise was an
organized crime family, having divergent, personal goals, though
held together as a collectivity by a common purpose.
The Eleventh Circuit's reading of the RICO statute in
Mohawk allows it to observe just the kind of enterprise that the
Seventh Circuit rejected in Baker. If the Supreme Court were to
reverse Mohawk, then the Baker line of argument would stand and
would have detrimental consequences for the prosecution of
crimes and civil violations.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 710 (citing United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1560-61
(2d Cir. 1991) (finding that violent infighting in "Westies," an Irish gang, did
not negate existence of RICO enterprise)).
158. See, e.g., Bachman v. Bear Stearns & Co., 178 F.3d 930, 932 (7th Cir.
1999) ("A firm and its employees, or a parent and its subsidiaries, are not an
enterprise separate from the firm itself.").
159. Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 691 (7th Cir. 2004) ("a large, repu-
table manufacturer ... plus its dealers [, independently owned or otherwise,]
and other agents (or any subset of the members of the corporate family) do not
constitute an enterprise")) (citing Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329
F.3d 923, 934 (7th Cir. 2003)).
160. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63-64 (1997) (stating that a
RICO conspiracy is to be evaluated under traditional standards: "The partners
in the criminal plan must agree to pursue the same criminal objective and may
divide up the work, yet each is responsible for the acts of each other.") (citing
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646 (1946)).
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The Baker decision is in conflict with other circuits on
another question. The Seventh Circuit's holding that employees
cannot bind together to sue their employer for damages to their
"property" (albeit measured by lost wages) under a statute that is
(1) not part of the labor laws, and (2) does not raise a matter
under the collective bargaining agreement, is in conflict with the
decision of the Sixth Circuit in Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc.'6 1 In
Trollinger, as in Baker, the plaintiffs brought a "wage-related dis-
pute between [themselves and] Tyson Foods, Inc."'16 2 As in
Baker, they alleged "that Tyson violated RICO by engaging in a
scheme with several employment agencies to depress the wages
of Tyson's hourly employees by hiring illegal immigrants. '"163
Relying upon Baker, Tyson urged the Sixth Circuit to concur in
the Seventh Circuit's analysis and dismiss the case because the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) gives the union, not the
individual employees, the exclusive right to prosecute it.164
The Sixth Circuit rejected "Baker's suggestion" of an "exclu-
sive" right to sue in the union as "[in]correct." '6 5 The Sixth Cir-
cuit's holding that the workers could sue over wage claims was
evident from a series of cases interpreting both the Act and the
subsequently enacted Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 185). These cases indicate that Con-
gress did not intend to preclude all worker lawsuits arising from
the mandatory bargaining issues.16 6 Hence, the union was not
the "exclusive" party to bring a claim for relief arising from other
statutory rights not contemplated by Congress in enacting the
Act. The case for wage depression was an example of an area not
foreclosed by the Act.167 Thus, the Seventh Circuit's claim in
161. 370 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2004).
162. Id. at 605.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 620.
165. Id. at 621.
166. See Office & Prof'l Employees Int'l Union, Local 2 v. FIDC, 962 F.2d
63, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (R. GinsburgJ.) ("[W]hen a claim derives from a collec-
tive bargaining agreement-an arrangement negotiated by a union to which it
is a signatory-the labor organization is an appropriate (although not the only
appropriate party) to vindicate employees' rights.") (citation omitted). See also
Trollinger, 370 F.3d at 621.
167. The principle involved is basic: one statutory right is not to be deni-
grated by another unless Congress expressly or implicitly so intends. See, e.g.,
FCC v. Next Wave Personal Commc'n, Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 304 (2003) ("When
two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a
clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as
effective.").
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Baker, that " [i] ndividual workers may step into the union's shoes
only if it has violated its duty of fair representation," is wrong.
168
The Court's interpretation of the RICO statute in these
cases will have tremendous public policy consequences, as will be
considered below.
C. The Legal Impact of the Seventh Circuit's Decision
If the Eleventh Circuit's Mohawk decision is reversed and the
Baker decision applied across the board, then many criminal
RICO prosecutions will be vulnerable to motions to dismiss.
Most RICO prosecutions allege association-in-fact enterprises,
and any competent defense counsel will cite Baker's "divergent
goals" holding. District judges following Mohawk and Baker may
have no alternative but to dismiss indictments. Therefore, not
only would the Baker ruling undermine criminal prosecutions, it
would also take from employees an ability to sanction employers
who undermine the wages of legal workers by employing
undocumented workers en masse.
Mohawk's argument undermines the use of RICO as a
prosecutorial tool by converting proof of the elements of a RICO
violation into an absolute defense to prosecution. Establishing
the enterprise requires proof of "association in fact" and the
defendant's employment by or association with the enterprise. 69
The facts necessary to prove the existence of an "association-in-
fact" enterprise, which requires (1) that the members of the
enterprise "associate[ ] together for a common purpose of
engaging in a course of conduct";17 ° and (2) the defendant's
association with that enterprise will also demonstrate agency.
Therefore, the more clearly established the structure of the asso-
ciation-in-fact enterprise, the more certain that the existence of
agency relationships will collapse every defendant into that enter-
prise. Accordingly, proof of the statute's required elements of
association and employment will render the defendant indistinct
from the enterprise and will doom any conviction as a matter of
law. This would render the statute only effective in prosecution
of enterprise members who are so tenuously linked as to consti-
tute mere association, and not agency.
168. Trollinger, 370 F.3d at 621 ("The historical context in which these
statutes were enacted... suggests that when Congress made unions the exclu-
sive representative of employees for purposes of collective bargaining, it did not
mean to establish unions as the exclusive representative of employees for pur-
poses of all wage-related litigation.").
169. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(4), 1962(c) (2006).
170. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
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The split also has significant meaning for the effective
administration of the federal immigration statutes and of RICO.
Allowing these conflicts to continue on these key issues of "exclu-
sive" representation and "common goals" in association-in-fact
enterprises is not fair to workers seeking fair treatment in differ-
ent circuits, and it undermines RICO's effectiveness, criminally
and civilly, for example, as a guarantor of general integrity171 of
the country's national marketplace. The circuit split poses a hur-
dle to American labor insofar as the Seventh Circuit's decision
restricts one of its tools to insure fair wages. Indeed, RICO is the
only statute that permits private citizens to sue to enforce the
immigration statutes; it steps in to provide a private action where
justice is not met.
If the immigration statutes are to be undermined, or RICO
is to be significantly limited, as attempted by the Seventh Circuit
in Bakerand by Mohawk, that reform ought to come, if at all, from
Congress itself.172 Congress has deliberately enlarged RICO's
scope to bring the private enforcement mechanism to bear on
the general issue of undocumented persons in the work place.
That ought to end the matter judicially, absent constitutional
considerations not implicated here.
173
Through Mohawk the Court can affirm the RICO tool in its
use against those corporations and other entities that exploit its
laborers to the detriment of both American workers and their
undocumented counterparts.
D. RICO: A Tool for a Wide Plaintiff Base
In Trollinger, Baker, and Mohawk, the RICO plaintiffs were
legal employees who had been injured by the use of undocu-
mented workers in a way that resulted in the plaintiffs either los-
171. "There are three possible kinds of force which a firm can resort to:
violence (or threat of it), deception, or market power." CARL KAYSEN & DONALD
F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 17 (1959). Antitrust law focuses on the third,
"scheme to defraud" focuses on the second, and RICO focuses on the first and
second. Together, they seek a marketplace characterized by integrity, fiscal and
physical. Indeed, the litany of major company names in the news for illegal
conduct is dizzying. See, e.g., Pigs, Pay, and Power, THE ECONOMIST, June 28,
2003, at 7 (discussing Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, HealthSouth,
Imclone, Global Crossing, etc.) (" [T] he basic task is to insure that existing laws
are vigorously enforced and that any loopholes in them are closed .... ").
172. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989)
("[R]ewriting [RICO] ... it is ajob for Congress, if it is so inclined, and not for
this Court.").
173. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587 ("There is no argument that Congress acted
beyond its power .... That being the case, the courts are without authority to
restrict the application of [RICO].").
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ing their jobs or having their wages lowered. The Commercial
plaintiffs were not employees of the defendant company, but
rather employees of a competitor company whose RICO claim
was based on their wages being undercut by the illegally hired
undocumented workers. This RICO mechanism has also been
used by undocumented workers to enforce existing labor laws
that protect them from exploitation, as seen in Zavala v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. 1
74
In Zavala, Wal-Mart contractors allegedly hired undocu-
mented persons to perform janitorial services. While conceding
in the complaint that they were without legal immigration status,
the plaintiffs asserted a right to pay owed for work performed
that approximates that which an employee with legal status
would merit. Even though IRCA prohibits employ-ment of
unknown undocumented persons, the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) does not prohibit backpay claims by any person in the
United States, regardless of immigration status. 7 5 The workers
174. 393 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.N.J. 2005).
175. Related to the discussion of injury to "property" throughout this
Note is personal and tort injury incurred during the course of employment. In
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002), the Supreme
Court ruled that an undocumented worker may not seek back pay under the
National Labor Relations Act. Because Hoffman only applies to money that one
would have earned (and not what one actually did earn), it would not apply to
the determination of damages for tort or workman's compensation injuries
(based on past earnings). The question of whether this federal interpretation
preempts state law will turn on state public policy goals until Congress or the
Supreme Court specifically mandates federal preemption. See Safeharbor
Employer Serv. I, Inc. v. Velaquez, 860 So.2d 984, 985-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003) (holding that Hoffman does not preempt state law precluding the award-
ing of worker compensation claims). See also Design Kitchen & Bath v. Lagos,
882 A.2d 817 (Md. Ct. App. 2005); Cont'l PET Techs v. Palacias, 604 S.E.2d 627,
630 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005); Rosa v. Partner in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 1000
(N.H. 2005); Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Gutzman, 116 S.W.2d 233, 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2003).
As Hoffman does not control other state laws on labor enforcement and
compensation, other policy considerations, such as fairness, will influence how
the states approach the issue of undocumented workers. The states are univer-
sally against applying Hoffman in workman's compensation suits by undocu-
mented persons. See cases supra.
Facially, workman's compensation claims can be distinguished from back
pay in that the former has already been earned, while the latter is prospective
pay. The state statutes and state court decisions have invoked quantum meruit
and equitable estoppel to find that undocumented persons may still be entitled
to prospective payments. Under a quantum meruit theory, a person ought to
receive just compensation for work that was performed. States have used this
principle, along with equitable estoppel, to justify the award of workman's com-
pensation even to those who are unauthorized to work legally. Under Florida
law, for example, an employer who hires an undocumented person is estopped
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alleged a criminal enterprise with a common goal of systemati-
cally violating immigration and labor and employment laws for
profit at the expense of undocumented workers. These workers
were then used to facilitate the employer's failure to comply with
minimum wage and hour laws. Wal-Mart's motion to dismiss was
granted on the RICO charges, as the plaintiffs failed to allege
sufficient facts to state a claim that Wal-Mart conspired to com-
mit, or aided and abetted, the particular predicate acts of trans-
porting, harboring, or encouraging undocumented aliens.176
The motion was denied on the plaintiffs' FLSA argument,
with the court stating that it 'joins the growing chorus acknowl-
edging the right of undocumented workers to seek relief for
work already performed under the FLSA."' 7 7 Even though
Zavala was dismissed on its RICO enterprise and conspiracy
claims, employers must now give serious consideration to the
possibility of a RICO suit in calculating the benefits and draw-
backs of exploiting undocumented workers.
This RICO tool can also be used by the government. In July
2005, a Canyon County, Idaho Commissioner used RICO to sue
in United States District Court four businesses and one non-
profit organization that had allegedly hired undocumented
workers. The defendants were accused of knowingly hiring hun-
dreds of undocumented migrants, partly through agreements
with worker recruiting companies. The injury complained of in
this case was the cost to the county of providing medical care,
jails, and schools. This was the first time a government entity has
used RICO to demand damages from businesses for the costs of
allegedly illegal employees. 178 This demonstrates that not only
from asserting that the employee is undocumented when he knew or should
have known of the true status of the person. See Cenvill Dev. Corp. v. Candello,
478 So.2d 1168, 1170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("This holding prevents unau-
thorized aliens from suffering at the hands of an employer who would know-
ingly hire the alien and then conveniently use the unauthorized alien status to
avoid paying wage loss benefits."). A New Hampshire court has used similar
principles to suggest that undocumented workers are entitled to tort recovery
based on both past and future earnings. See infra note 180.
176. Zavala, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 304-09. The court also found that plain-
tiffs failed to allege the RICO predicate act of involuntary servitude, since they
could not allege that they did not have any way to avoid "continued service or
confinement" as required under United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 487 (2d
Cir. 1964): "While a credible threat of deportation may come close to the line,
it still leaves the employee with a choice, and we do not see how we could fairly
bring it within § 1584 [(the federal statute prohibiting involuntary servi-
tude)] . Z..." avala, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 310.
177. Zavala, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
178. Rebecca Boone, Vasquez's Latest Tactic Could Set Trend, IDAHO STATES-
MAN, July 11, 2005, at Al, available at http://www.idahostatesman.com/apps/
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can private entities use this tool to address some of the costs of
the undocumented worker population, it can also be used to pre-
vent the exploitation of such workers and to recoup public losses.
C. The Law and Economics of RJCO and Immigration
As demonstrated above, RICO provides a judicial tool for
the protection of workers from the detrimental impact of
undocumented workers. This tool is not only compelled by the
statute itself, but it can also help accomplish what targeted guest
worker programs aim to do in addressing the public's concerns
over undocumented labor injuring American workers. Here, the
four circuits have approved a tool that meets the policy goals of
guest worker programs. This section will further explain how
RICO meets these goals and it will address remaining ancillary
issues.
Under the Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, legal
workers would have a cause of action only when they can show
they have been injured. There would be no cause of action in
industries where the American economy would benefit and
American workers would not be hurt.'79 There would be no
RICO cause of action because, in these industries, undocu-
mented workers are sought not because they are cheaper,
exploitable labor (which would result in the movement of jobs
from American workers to exploited undocumented persons),
but because they are the only labor available to keep an industry
in the United States from going out of business, and the working
presence of such persons is not a detriment to Americans, who
would not accept these jobs.I ° Therefore, the need for guest
worker programs can be partially avoided by using this judicial
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/2005071 I /NEWS01/507110308/1001/NEWS. A district
court judge dismissed the Commissioner's complaint in December 2005, ruling
that the county's claimed higher social expenditures were simply the costs of a
government entity. The Commission voted 2-1 to appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
See Rebecca Boone, Canyon Will Appeal RICO Decision, IDAHO STATESMAN, Jan. 7,
2006, at Al, available at http://www.idahostatesman.com/apps/pbcs.dll/arti-
cle?AID=/20060107/NEWSO1 /601070317/1001/NEWS.
179. This might not be the case (i.e., there would still be a cause of action
under this theory), as stated supra note 9, where the government is the plaintiff.
However, the government could still have a cause of action if the loss of
undocumented workers poses a greater cost on the community than was borne
by the local government without the presence of the undocumented persons.
Such cost reversal could come if, for example, the business and job creation of
an undocumented population outweighs the costs created by such a population
through public expenditures.
180. Goldfarb, supra note 106, at 188.
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model, but more realistically, used as a complement to a broader
policy.
Of course, the use of RICO in this manner does not solve all
of the problems associated with undocumented foreign-born
labor. Even with this private cause of action that can protect
American workers from the impact of undocumented labor in
industries where there is a supply of American labor, problems
remain with industries in which there is little or no competition
between undocumented persons and legal workers forjobs (such
as the agriculture industry). When it comes to these jobs, the
government would miss out on the tax benefits of employing
workers legally. More urgently, from the workers' perspective,
undocumented persons in these industries would have to fend
for themselves, as they would lack many of the guarantees and
protections that legal workers have.
CONCLUSION
The presence of undocumented workers in the United
States presents many concerns for Americans. The effect on the
American laborer is particularly alarming, as it pits the poor
against the poor; impoverished foreigners arriving on American
shores seeking prosperity end up competing with many of the
least educated and poorest Americans for low-paying jobs. 8'
Such a scenario is at odds with an ethic that values all humans
and seeks for people to be treated in a way that befits the com-
mon good, not the narrow interests of corporations or private
enterprises. The legislature and the judiciary are then left with
finding a way to deal with this dilemma.
Embedded in these political and judicial proposals is the
complex reality that muddles immigration, economics, and eth-
ics. Hoffman, in holding that undocumented workers are not
entitled to back pay under the NLRA,' 8 2 was decried as embold-
ening employers to argue that undocumented persons have no
workplace rights. Such laws can empower unscrupulous employ-
ers to exploit undocumented workers, either to their detriment,
the detriment of other workers, or the detriment of competitors.
Certainly, employers should not be given incentives by the law to
treat undocumented persons as commodities.
183
181. Paral, supra note 39.
182. See discussion supra note 175.
183. In Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 1000-01 (N.H.
2005), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire observed:
[T]ort deterrence principles provide a compelling reason to allow an
award of such damages against a person responsible for an illegal
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The exploitative nature of the employer and undocumented
employee relationship is different in the service industry than it
is in the agricultural industry. In the latter, workers are
employed in jobs that would not otherwise exist if there was a
higher wage. In this situation, it is difficult to say that workers
are being exploited when the employer has no choice but to pay
a low wage or go out of business. The former situation is differ-
ent in that the employer perceives the vulnerable position an un-
documented person is in and takes advantage of that bad
position.
There are other long-term ethical considerations involved
with employing undocumented persons in jobs that Americans
seemingly do not want. Allowing farmers to pay less to their
undocumented agricultural workers in the United States, as the
RICO mechanism would allow, is a subsidy in disguise-and one
that, while it might help on the micro level of putting more
money into a worker's hands than he would otherwise have, will
not help the developing nations that send willing workers to the
United States. 84
alien's employment when that person knew or should have known of
that illegal alien's status. The threat of tort liability acts as an incentive
to reduce the risk of injuries .... To refuse to allow recovery against a
person responsible for an illegal alien's employment who knew or
should have known of the illegal alien's status would provide an incen-
tive for such persons to target illegal aliens for employment in the
most dangerous jobs or to provide illegal aliens with substandard
working conditions. It would allow such persons to treat illegal aliens
as disposable commodities who may be replaced the moment they are
damaged. Such a result is incompatible with tort deterrence
principles.
We recognize that defendants . . . , as general contractors, are not
direct employers of the plaintiff. Yet, [federal law] does not excuse
general contractors who knowingly employ an illegal alien. 8 U.S.C.
§ 124a(a) (4). ('[A] person or other entity who uses a contract, sub-
contract, or exchange ... to obtain the labor of an alien in the United
States knowing that the alien is an unauthorized alien . . . shall be
considered to have hired the alien for employment in the United
States in violation of [federal law].'). Nor shall a contractor be
excused from compensating an illegal alien for lost United States
earnings when the general contractor knew or should have known of
that illegal alien's status. We choose to hold a general contractor to a
standard based upon constructive knowledge because to hold other-
wise would provide a general contractor with a convenient device to
insulate itself from damages, because it would be all too easy to claim
ignorance.
184. Foreign workers in the United States benefit the workers' countries
of origin insofar as the workers send back money (remittances) that helps sup-
port the local economy in the country of origin. Over twenty billion dollars
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This Note showed that the judiciary already possesses a tool
to broach at least part of this complicated topic. The circuit split
highlights a very important issue: how private mechanisms can be
employed to sanction companies that attempt to undercut Amer-
ican wages through the employment of undocumented workers.
There are problems that remain to be addressed. The mere exis-
tence of a private cause of action does not mean that workers will
go through the steps to organize a suit and pursue it. As men-
tioned, this does not solve the problem of illegal hiring in indus-
tries where there is no oversupply of American labor. Still, this
Note clarified that at least part of what public policy proposals
seek to do is already achievable under the Second, Sixth, Ninth,
and most recently, the Eleventh Circuits' rulings. Still, this judi-
cial tool must be only a part of a more compre-hensive immigra-
tion policy.
One way for the legislature to address this problem is
through the creation of a guest worker program that gives every-
one the same wage, social security tax, workman's compen-
sation, and protections for the same job. This would not only
account for the economic reality of demand for labor, but by put-
ting laborers "on the books," would help ensure that they are not
exploited and that they pay taxes. Unfortunately, current legisla-
tion in the United States House of Representatives does not
include the guest worker proposals. The Sensenbrenner bill was
purposefully enforcement-only, but its provisions will do little to
relieve the problems of backlogs and inefficiency in the immigra-
tion system and will do much harm to undocumented persons,
their families, and their advocates. Bill proponents were success-
ful in removing a proposed amendment by Representative Flake
that would have included a guest worker program.1 8 5 Represen-
flows from the United States to Mexico in remittances. See Legislators Go After
Remittance Monies, FRONTERA NORTE SUR, June-Aug. 2005, available at http://
www.nmsu.edu/-frontera/immi.html. In Mexico, this is the third largest
source of revenue, behind taxes and oil. Id.
185. Though a guest worker program went unmentioned in the version
of the House bill that passed, it remains on the minds of many Congressmen,
especially those that represent agriculture constituencies. One news source
reported:
Only agricultural growers, whose industry relies heavily on foreign
workers, many of them undocumented, have consistently asked
lawmakers for a workable guest worker program that would give them
access to legal workers, Putnam said. "The other guys woke up three
days ago and hit the panic button."
In the past year, Putnam said "only a handful" of lawmakers who
represent agricultural districts, including himself, have been "scream-
ing at the top of our lungs" that any new immigration plan must
include guest worker provisions.
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tative Flake's non-binding sense of the Congress would have
stated that "a necessary part" of securing the border "entails the
creation of a secure legal channel by which the foreign workers
needed to keep the United States economy going may enter and
leave the country."1 6 Supporters of the House bill will likely
encounter stiff opposition when the Senate takes up the issue.
In late February, Senator Arlen Specter circulated a bill in
the Senate that calls for a vast guest worker program that would
legalize millions of illegal aliens and import an unlimited num-
ber of additional workers from abroad, in addition to unprece-
dented increases in legal immigration. It would lighten some of
the burdens on employers by requiring them only to verify the
status of prospective employees, not ones that are currently
employed, as the House version would. Senator Specter's propo-
sal would also provide a limited legalization that would require
sponsorship by an employer and the beneficiary would first have
to leave and re-enter the United States. Significantly, the propo-
sal would lower the income requirements of a sponsoring family
member from one-hundred to one-hundred twenty five pdercent
of the federal poverty guidelines, thereby making legal family
reunification more accessible.
A guest worker proposal would need to consider lessons
from the past, including the Bracero program, to do more than
just supply employers with a stream of vulnerable workers. The
Specter bill, like President Bush's proposal, would require work-
ers to return to their home countries after a three-year period
(with one three-year extension). While this may alleviate some
fears about a permanent migration, the failure to include a path
to permanent residency is short-sighted. Bringing in people
solely for work purposes, and asking them to leave their families
behind, is too much to ask and too much to expect. On that
Putnam said there has been little enthusiasm when other "aggies"
have raised the issue at Republican conference meetings. "Nobody
would clap. Nobody would say anything. Then the other guys would
get up and say, 'Secure the border' and stuff, and the whole place
would go wild like the Rolling Stones had just come to town."
But the situation changed after the business community weighed
in right before the floor debate, Putnam said. "As the more main-
stream business has become engaged, then the rest of the [Republi-
can] conference has said, 'Well I guess we do need comprehensive
legislation.'"
Fawn Johnson, House Passes Immigration Enforcement Bill Without Nonbinding
Guestworker Language, BNA DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Dec. 17, 2005, http:/
/subscript.bna.com/pic2/derupdat.nsf/id/BNAP-6K6QUE?OpenDocument
(quoting Rep. Adam Putnam (R-FL)).
186. Id.
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note, the Specter bill's increase in the cap of family-based, as well
as employment-based, immigration is an important element that
was missing from the House bill.
In early April 2006, the Senate reached an agreement on the
thorny issue of guest workers. This agreement would provide a
path to citizenship for the undocumented who have lived in the
United States for at least five years, which would be approxi-
mately seven million people. To qualify for this path, these per-
sons would need to continue working, pass background checks,
pay fines and back taxes, and learn English.' 87 The agreement
provides stricter provisions for those who have been in the
United States for a shorter period of time. The provisions of this
agreement are necessary steps for a policy that does justice to the
economic reality of the American workforce without exploiting
foreign-born labor. Still, as of the spring recess, the Senate
agreement was stalled due to procedural and political clashes
over amendments. Even with a Senate agreement finalized, Sen-
ate leaders will have to reconcile this controversial agreement
with the equally controversial enforcement only bill from the
House. Although President Bush has come out in support of
guest worker programs (he made it a priority at the beginning of
his first term, but it fell from his priorities after September 11 th),
he is not willing, or able, to pressure the Republicans to act on it.
With the House conservatives poised to reject the Senate com-
promise, 188 these much needed guest worker provisions, and the
Americans and immigrants they benefit, may continue to
flounder.
The proposals discussed do not go far enough in merely sug-
gesting a guest worker program. An earned legalization would
take care of the ten million undocumented persons in the coun-
try right now, and it would help the United States. It would stabi-
lize the workforce and push all wages up. It also is a pro-security
policy, in that it allows the government to identify and have
records of everyone who is here. There would also need to be a
right to bargain and to change employers, to prevent the abuses
of previous programs and allow the people in the program to
maintain their human dignity. Congress should consider
reforming family-based immigration, if family unity really is a pri-
ority, so that the waiting times for family members are not so
long. A comprehensive policy must also address the "push" fac-
tors that encourage people to seek work abroad.
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As long as foreign-born persons, with or without legal docu-
mentation, flock to this country-and they will be coming for the
foreseeable future-there must be a practical policy that does
the most to benefit American workers while at the same time
preventing the exploitation of those who risk death and spend
life savings to come here willing to work at very low wages. Guest
worker programs propose to protect American workers while
providing opportunities for foreign workers in the United States.
Part of this goal can be achieved through a private cause of
action under RICO in industries where there is a demand for
American labor. While these proposals resolve all of the
problems associated with this complicated issue, they are part of
a system that can provide an honest and dignified opportunity to
live the American Dream.
